Time for Détente with iran

Time for Détente with iran
Ray Takeyh
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007
Summary:  To tame the growing power of Iran, Washington must eschew military options, the prospect of conditional talks, and attempts to contain the regime. Instead, it should adopt a new policy of d鴥nte. By offering the pragmatists in Tehran a chance to resume diplomatic and economic relations with the United States, it could help them sideline the radicals and tip Iran's internal balance of power in their favor.

  Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic".

 [continued...]

The best way toward an effective, engaged relationship with Iran is for Washington to open direct negotiations on issues of critical importance, along four separate tracks. Since the purpose of the talks would be to normalize relations, the first track should deal with setting a timetable for resuming a diplomatic relationship, gradually phasing out U.S. sanctions, and returning Iran's frozen assets. Holding out meaningful incentives such as these would go a long way toward facilitating productive discussions on more difficult issues and would likely enhance goodwill toward the United States among the Iranian public.

Given the progress of Iran's nuclear program, this issue deserves priority in second-track talks. The notion that the Islamic Republic will follow the Libyan model and completely dismantle its nuclear infrastructure is not tenable. The task of negotiators working on this issue would be to devise measures that Tehran could take to win back the trust of the international community, such as submitting to a rigorous inspection regime to show that its nuclear program is not being diverted for military purposes. Iran should be granted its NPT rights to develop a limited capability to enrich uranium; in turn, however, it should have to submit to verification procedures such as snap inspections, allow the permanent presence of personnel from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and make full disclosures about its previous activities. Iran's ultimate goal may be to produce nuclear weapons. But the case of Iraq demonstrates that an exacting verification process backed by the international community can obstruct such ambitions.

Negotiations on a third track should focus on Iraq. In light of the Baker-Hamilton report, many Washington policymakers and pundits have been busy offering reasons why Iran will not be helpful. But many of these arguments are fallacious. The first myth is the notion that Tehran would prefer to see U.S. troops remain and die in Iraq since mounting casualties will deter the United States from embarking on another misadventure. In fact, after nearly four years of an inconclusive war, Iranian officials believe that the United States' imperial ambitions have been sufficiently deflated -- that the giant requires no further bleeding. The second myth holds that gaining Iran's cooperation would require shelving UN sanctions against its nuclear program. But such reasoning presupposes that there is a robust UN process that needs to be retarded, which is inaccurate. And unlike their U.S. counterparts, Iranian leaders perceive little connection between their Iraq policy and their nuclear policy. The prevailing consensus within Tehran today is that the U.S. occupation in Iraq prevents measurable political progress there and that the only way Iraq can be stabilized is by gradually removing U.S. forces.

Whatever the perceptions and motivations of Tehran, its influence in Iraq makes it an indispensable partner. Although Iran has been busy enhancing the fortunes of its Iraqi Shiite allies and arming their militias, and Washington has responded with recriminations, the two governments have many objectives in common. Tehran, like Washington, is interested in defusing the ongoing civil war and maintaining Iraq's unity. The Iranian ruling elite also appreciates that the most suitable way to realize its aims is through elections, which are bound to further empower the majority Shiite community. A functioning Iraqi state would facilitate the departure of U.S. forces, neutralize the insurgency, and incorporate moderate Sunnis into the governing order -- all goals that serve the interests of both Iran and the United States.

Instead of bemoaning Iran's influence in Iraq, U.S. policymakers should focus on the challenge of managing that power constructively. Once Iran's legitimate influence is recognized and a framework for harmonizing the two countries' policies is established, it may be easier for Washington to make demands of Tehran. Washington would be in a better position to pressure Tehran, for example, to temper the Iraqi Shiites' secessionist tendencies and rein in recalcitrant actors such as the Shiite militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr. Moreover, Iran today is one of Iraq's largest trading partners. The United States should further facilitate such trade because it helps stabilize southern Iraq. The sooner Washington realizes that Tehran can play a useful role in Iraq, the sooner it may be able to prevent the fragmentation of Iraq and the further destabilization of the Persian Gulf.

The fourth -- and thorniest -- set of negotiations would have to focus on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which Tehran has steadfastly opposed, often by supporting terrorism. Tehran's antagonism toward Israel is based on its Islamist ideology, which denies the legitimacy of the Zionist enterprise. Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas gives Tehran a voice in an area beyond its military reach. With Hezbollah emerging triumphant and more popular than ever from its conflict with Israel last summer, Iran's resolution has stiffened further. Washington will need to change that posture. If Iran and the United States attempt to normalize their relationship, then, for the first time, Tehran's belligerence toward Israel could lead to its losing real benefits.

A careful look at Iran's history reveals that its behavior can change for the better. In the 1990s, for instance, the right incentives persuaded Tehran to stop assassinating Iranian dissidents in Europe and supporting certain terrorist activities in the Persian Gulf. In 1997, a German court convicted Iranian government agents of murdering Kurdish opposition leaders in a restaurant in Berlin five years earlier, leading European governments to withdraw their emissaries from Tehran and impose restrictions on trade. The Islamic Republic quickly abandoned the practice of targeting dissidents in exile. In a similar vein, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states agreed to normalize relations with Iran in the 1990s only if it stopped supporting radical elements within these states. In this case, too, the strategic advantages of d鴥nte convinced Tehran to change its ways.

Washington should apply those lessons now. As the United States and Iran attempt to resolve their differences, a natural momentum is likely to push Tehran away from its opposition to the Middle East peace process and its reliance on terrorism. That shift should be helped along with diplomatic and economic inducements. The point would be not to persuade Tehran to abandon Hezbollah, for example, but to pressure Tehran so that it, in turn, can persuade Hezbollah to play a constructive role in Lebanese politics and stop attacking Israel.

For nearly three decades, high emotions and irresponsible rhetoric have obstructed the development of a rational relationship between the United States and Iran. Too often, pragmatism has been sacrificed at the altar of ideology, and common interests have been obscured by convoluted historical grievances. Today, however, there exists in Iran at least one powerful faction -- the pragmatists among the new right -- willing to consider accommodation with Washington. Should Washington reciprocate by devising a comprehensive strategy of d鴥nte, it might be possible for Iran and the United States to finally overcome their mutual hostility.

A new paradigm cannot preclude tension, or even conflict, but it could persuade Tehran that its interests would be best served if it voluntarily restrained its radical tendencies. Iran will remain a problem for the United States for the foreseeable future; the question is how best to manage its complexities and contradictions. An offer by the United States to normalize relations and start talks on all outstanding issues between the two states would give Iran a chance to choose whether it wants to be a nation defending legitimate imperatives or one guided by self-defeating delusions. And for the first time in decades, there is an indication that Iran may opt for the former.

 

Time for Détente with iran

Iran
Ray Takeyh
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007
Summary:  To tame the growing power of Iran, Washington must eschew military options, the prospect of conditional talks, and attempts to contain the regime. Instead, it should adopt a new policy of d鴥nte. By offering the pragmatists in Tehran a chance to resume diplomatic and economic relations with the United States, it could help them sideline the radicals and tip Iran's internal balance of power in their favor.

  Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic".

 [continued...]

The moderates agree with the radicals that to enhance its influence Iran needs a nuclear weapons capability. As the deputy head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Hosseinitash, has noted, "The nuclear program is an opportunity for us to make endeavors to acquire a strategic position and consolidate our national identity." But the moderates also believe in restraint. They advocate continued adherence to Iran's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and stress the importance of offering confidence-building measures to the international community. They hope that by improving Tehran's relationship with Washington they can assuage U.S. concerns about Iran's nuclear development without having to abandon the program.

Hovering over this debate is the indecisive supreme leader, who so far has tentatively supported the pragmatists' drive for negotiations with the United States. On the one hand, Khamenei, a stern ideologue suspicious of the United States, seems to endorse Ahmadinejad's fiery denunciations of the West and his assertive Islamism. Khamenei has deficient religious credentials -- his lack of erudition places him at a disadvantage in the hierarchical clerical estate -- and that weakness has forced him to rely on reactionary elements to bolster his power; it would be difficult for him to rein in the determined Ahmadinejad. On the other hand, Khamenei's relationship with the hard-liners has always been uneasy, as they have doubted his resolution during times of crisis. In order to survive the treacherous politics of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has balanced different factions without unduly empowering any one of them.

So far, the pragmatists have managed to nudge Khamenei toward accepting potential negotiations with the United States over issues of mutual concern. But Iran's political landscape is changing rapidly. The United States' declining fortunes in Iraq, Hezbollah's touted victory against Israel last summer, and the success of Ahmadinejad's defiant nuclear diplomacy seem to prove right those who call for confrontation. The supreme leader, who is generally prone to indecision, now seems disinclined to settle the internal debates in Tehran in a conclusive manner.

THE UNITED WAY

The most effective way for Washington to resolve this uncertainty in its favor would be to practice more imaginative diplomacy. That would require more than a policy shift; it would require a paradigm shift. Guided by the notion of containment, U.S. policymakers have long seen the normalization of relations as the end result of a long process of negotiations. But with a new policy of engagement, normalization would have to be the starting point of talks; it would then facilitate discussions on issues such as nuclear weapons and terrorism. A strategy that seeks to create a web of mutually reinforcing security and economic arrangements has the best chance of tying Iran to the status quo in the region. In essence, a new situation would be created in which Tehran's relationship with Washington would be more valuable to the regime than either its ties to Hezbollah or its pursuit of nuclear arms.

To provoke such a change, Washington must strengthen the hands of the pragmatists in Tehran by offering Iran relief from sanctions and diplomatic relations. Washington's recognition of Iran's regional status and deepened economic ties with the West might finally enable the pragmatists to push Khamenei to marginalize the radicals who insist that only confrontation with the United States can allow Iran to achieve its national objectives.

As the United States reconsiders its Iran policy, it should dispense with the notion of offering Tehran security guarantees. It is conventional, even routine, in Washington policy circles to suggest that the Iran conundrum can be resolved only if the Bush administration pledges not to attack Iran. This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how the Islamic Republic perceives its power and its place in the Middle East today. The guardians of the theocratic regime do not fear the United States; they do not relate to the international community from a position of strategic vulnerability. Tehran now seeks not assurances against U.S. military strikes but an acknowledgment of its status and influence.

The United States does need to make important changes to its approach to Iran, however, in terms of both substance and style. Given the theocratic nature of the Iranian regime and its paranoia, Washington will have to adapt its rhetoric. U.S. officials can no longer denounce Iran as an "outpost of tyranny" or the "central banker of terrorism" in one breath and propose negotiations in the next. Like all regimes born of revolution, Tehran insists that the international community not just recognize its interests but also legitimize its power. Iran's theocrats are in no way unique; remember that for decades the Soviets demanded that the United States officially acknowledge postwar demarcations of Eastern Europe. A new U.S. policy toward Iran will have to officially recognize the authority of the Islamic Republic.

In this spirit, Washington must abandon its hopeless policy of regime change, including its paltry award of $75 million to Iranian exiles and for broadcasts into Iran. For one thing, such idealism is misplaced. Unlike Eastern Europe in the 1980s, Iran simply does not have a cohesive opposition movement willing to take direction and funding from the United States. For another, calls for regime change are counterproductive. Washington's fulminations and its provision of aid to the (nonexistent) democratic opposition have convinced many Iranian hard-liners that Washington's offer to negotiate is an attempt to undermine the regime in Tehran. Thus, any effort by moderates to engage with the United States is routinely denounced as a concession to the Great Satan's subversive ploys. Iran will certainly change, but on its own terms and at its own pace. The United States has an interest in promoting a more tolerant government in Tehran, but it will not help itself by broadcasting tall tales from Iranian exiles or with Bush's appeals to an indifferent Iranian populace. Integrating Iran into the world economy and global society would do far more to accelerate its democratic transformation.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

 

 

Time for Détente with iran

Time for Détente with iran
Ray Takeyh
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007

Summary:  To tame the growing power of Iran, Washington must eschew military options, the prospect of conditional talks, and attempts to contain the regime. Instead, it should adopt a new policy of d鴥nte. By offering the pragmatists in Tehran a chance to resume diplomatic and economic relations with the United States, it could help them sideline the radicals and tip Iran's internal balance of power in their favor.

  Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic".

 [continued...]

Westerners tend to see Iran's domestic politics as a contest between hard-liners and pragmatists. Jockeying by the former president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with the periodic ebbs and flows of the reform movement, have long preoccupied foreigners hoping to nudge Iranian politics toward democratization. But these observers have failed to realize that the old model of liberals versus conservatives no longer holds. The Iranian regime is in the process of transforming itself, under the influence of a rising group of young conservatives. The elders of the revolution still retain ultimate authority, but they are increasingly reacting to initiatives launched by their more assertive disciples. There no longer is a main fault line running between the left and the right; today, fissures in Tehran run between the old and the young -- and among the young of the new right.

Unlike their predecessors during 1980s, these new leaders -- even the provocative Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad -- have refrained from denouncing and plotting the overthrow of the monarchies of the Persian Gulf and the pro-Western regimes in Egypt and Jordan; they are more concerned with these states' external relations than with their internal composition. They have also refrained from exporting the Iranian Revolution to the fertile grounds of Iraq. Anticipating opposition to such attempts from senior Iraqi Shiite clerics and politicians, Iranian officials have preferred to focus on more practical concerns. Although they want a sympathetic and accommodating neighbor, they have no illusions that Iraqi Shiites would yield to Tehran's mandates. They continue to support Shiite parties in Iraq not because they wish to install an Iranian puppet or proxy there but because they hope to prevent the rise of another hostile Sunni-dominated regime.

This is not to suggest that the new right is not seeking meaningful changes in Iran's international relations. But the debates gripping Tehran today focus on how the regime can consolidate its sphere of influence and best exploit its status as an emerging regional hegemon. The displacement of the Taliban in Afghanistan and of Saddam Hussein, as well as the United States' entanglement in Iraq, have led callow reactionaries in Iran to perceive unique opportunities for their country's ascendance. Iran now sees itself as the indispensable nation in the Middle East.

DIVIDED WE STAND

As is customary for any leading faction in Iranian politics, however, the new right is itself fractured. And one of the matters that divide it is whether Iran's interests are best served by coexisting with the United States or by defying it. On one end of the spectrum are the radicals, whose most prominent exponent is President Ahmadinejad but who also include individuals in other critical posts, such as Morteza Rezai, the deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, and Mojtaba Hashemi Samareh, the deputy minister of the interior. Drawing their strength from the Revolutionary Guards (particularly its intelligence apparatus), the Basij paramilitary force, and groups such as the Alliance of the Developers of Islamic Iran and the Islamic Association of Engineers, the radicals cannot be easily ignored. Although many senior members of the clergy dismiss Ahmadinejad's religious pretensions, he has won the support of a narrow segment of the clerical class, especially the archreactionary Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, a spiritual guide to many young reactionaries.

The formative political experience of many of these radicals was not the 1979 revolution but the war against Iraq in the 1980s, which left them disdainful of the United States and the international community and obsessed with self-reliance. According to these veterans, the war showed that Iran's interests cannot be safeguarded by adhering to international treaties or appealing to Western opinion. In particular, Ahmadinejad and his allies see the United States as "the Great Satan," a source of cultural contamination and a rapacious capitalist power that exploits indigenous resources. In their view, the United States has caused all of Iran's misfortunes, from the shah's regime to the country's invasion by Iraq under Saddam. But they also see the United States as a declining power. General Hussein Salami, a commander of the Revolutionary Guards, said in March 2006, "We have assessed the ultimate power of global arrogance, and on this basis there is nothing to worry about."

Despite his deep religious convictions, Ahmadinejad is not a messianist seeking to usher in a new world order; he is a canny manipulator trying to rouse public indignation in a chaotic neighborhood. He understands that the carnage in Iraq, the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the inability of Arab rulers to stand up to Washington have created intense anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East and that there is growing popular hunger for a leader willing to stand up to Israel and the United States. And he very much wants to be that leader. To that end, he has used incendiary rhetoric about the Holocaust and Israel, support for Hezbollah, and appeals to Muslim solidarity to overcome sectarian divides, turning his Shiite Persian country into an object of admiration even for Sunni Arabs.

Understandably, too, Ahmadinejad and his allies view the acquisition of nuclear weapons as critical to consolidating Iran's position and helping the country eclipse U.S. influence in the region -- a prize worth suffering pain and sanctions to achieve. Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi has declared that task a "great divine test," and the newspaper Kayhan, a mouthpiece of the extreme right, has argued that the "knowledge and ability to make nuclear weapons" are "necessary in preparation for the next phase" on "the future battlefield." Given their distrust of Washington, the hard-liners assume that the United States' objections to their nuclear ambitions have less to do with countering proliferation than with exploiting the issue to enlist the support of U.S. allies against Iran. As Ahmadinejad has put it, "If this problem is resolved, then [the Americans] will bring up the issue of human rights. If the human rights issue is resolved, then they will probably bring up the issue of animal rights."

Ahmadinejad's antics have succeeded in turning him into an object of international attention over the last two years, making it easy for outside observers to overlook the emergence of another important camp within Iran's new right. This group, while also conservative, tends to stress Iranian nationalism over Islamic identity and pragmatism over ideology. Among the leaders of the group are Ali Larijani, the head of the Supreme National Security Council; Abbas Mohtaj, the commander of Iran's navy; and Ezzatollah Zarghami, the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting -- all nationalists who, like the radicals, were shaped by the Iran-Iraq War but who drew different conclusions from it. During the 1990s, as reformers took over many of Iran's state institutions, these conservatives retreated into research centers, particularly Imam Hussein University, to reassess Iran's international relations. Judging by their writings and speeches, they seem to have concluded both that the end of the Cold War and Iran's unique geographic location made it a natural regional power and that Iran's progress had been thwarted by the regime's ideological excesses and its unnecessarily hostile approach to the West. The only way for Iran to realize its potential, they argued, was for it to behave more judiciously, and that meant limiting some expressions of its influence, acceding to certain international norms, and negotiating mutually acceptable compacts with its adversaries. In the last two years, many members of this pragmatic faction have risen to influence within the Supreme National Security Council, the intelligence community, and the military. Using their links to traditional clerical networks and their intimate ties to the supreme leader, they are trying to wrest control of Iran's international relations from the militants. The real significance of Iran's municipal elections in December 2006, in which Ahmadinejad's camp scored disappointing results, lay not so much in the revival of the reform movement as in the fact that many younger conservatives who are uneasy about Ahmadinejad's policies did well.

Nothing divides the two groups of the new right more than their attitude toward the United States. The pragmatists argue that Iran's predominance cannot be guaranteed without a more rational relationship with Washington. In an interview in late 2005, Larijani said, "We may be sure that the Americans are our enemies," but "working with the enemy is part of the work of politics." He added, "The strategy of curbing and reducing disruptions and normalizing relations is itself beneficial in the long term." Like the hawks, Larijani and his allies argue that the U.S. presence in the Middle East is bound to diminish, but, unlike the hawks, they worry that it could continue to block Tehran's resurgence. In their view, smoothing relations with the United States would pave the way for Iran to increase its influence in the region.

 

Time for Détente with iran

Time for Détente with iran
Ray Takeyh
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007

Summary:  To tame the growing power of Iran, Washington must eschew military options, the prospect of conditional talks, and attempts to contain the regime. Instead, it should adopt a new policy of d鴥nte. By offering the pragmatists in Tehran a chance to resume diplomatic and economic relations with the United States, it could help them sideline the radicals and tip Iran's internal balance of power in their favor.

  Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic".

[continued...]

Were Washington to rationally consider its alternatives, it would quickly realize that the answer to these questions is no. But U.S. policy has long been dominated by a visceral suspicion of Tehran. During the heady days that followed the 1979 revolution, Iran's Islamist rage appeared awesome and dangerously expansive. The ruling clerical elite viewed Iran's borders as relics of a discredited past and seemed committed to exporting the revolution. The regional order, however, proved more durable than the mullahs had expected, and most of Iran's revolutionary dreams perished on the battlefields of Iraq in the 1980s. The costly war with Baghdad forced the clerical elite to realize the limits of its power and the impracticality of its ambitions. Tehran persisted with its universalist rhetoric, but its foreign policy became quite pragmatic. Still, a perception of Iran as a destabilizing force congealed in the U.S. imagination and has endured ever since, even though Iran stopped being a revisionist state long ago and has now become a medium-sized power seeking regional preeminence. Containment, in other words, ceased to be appropriate a while back because Iran stopped being a revolutionary state bent on forcibly exporting its model of government.

In fact, containment never worked -- and it has even less of a chance of working in the future. Its failures have been well documented in yearly reports by the State Department, which detail Iran's ongoing support for terrorism and warn of advances in its nuclear program. Sanctions and other forms of U.S. pressure have failed to prevent Iranian misbehavior. Worse, the Bush administration has taken steps recently that make containment an even less effective policy. Washington's ill-advised invasion of Iraq has benefited Iran by empowering local Shiite parties sympathetic to Tehran. Long gone are the days when a powerful, Sunni-dominated Iraq could function as a counterweight to Shiite power in Iran. Iraq's Shiites are hardly homogeneous, but the leading Shiite parties in power in Baghdad -- Dawa and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq -- have intimate ties to Tehran. This does not mean that Iraq's new leaders are willing to subordinate their interests to those of Iran, but they are unlikely to confront the Islamic Republic at the behest of Washington.

Nor is any other country in the Middle East likely to stand up to Iran today. A long tradition of purchasing security from the British Empire and then from the United States historically offered the Arab sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf a degree of independence vis-᭶is their powerful Persian neighbor. But the Bush administration's impetuous behavior and its inability to pacify Iraq have shattered local confidence in U.S. capabilities. Widespread anti-Americanism has made it harder for governments in the region to cooperate with Washington or to allow U.S. forces on their soil. The United States may be able to keep offshore naval forces and modest bases in reliable states such as Kuwait, but it is unlikely to have a significant presence in the region, as it is too unpopular with the masses and seems too erratic to the elites. Many Persian Gulf states now have more confidence in Iran's motivations than in the United States' destabilizing designs. And so as Iran's power increases, the local sheikdoms are likely to opt for accommodating Tehran rather than confronting it.

The international community has also seemed relatively indifferent to Iran's actions. Over the past year, the Bush administration has scored a number of procedural points against Tehran: for example, at Washington's insistence, the UN Security Council has censured Iran and urged suspension of its nuclear program. Despite such symbolic successes, however, few great powers now support the imposition of strenuous sanctions on the Islamic Republic. This is not because the French are pusillanimous or the Russians are unprincipled but because Washington's allies do not agree that Iran poses a major and urgent threat. For them, Iran's nuclear ambitions and even its penchant for terrorism are disturbing but manageable challenges that can be addressed without resorting to military force or coercive economic measures. During the early days of the Cold War, the United States was able to garner support for containing the Soviet Union because most of its European partners were as concerned about the Soviets as it was. Not so with Iran today; with the exception of Israel, few of the United States' friends seem very worried.

AN AFFAIR TO REMEMBER

In order to develop a smarter Iran policy, U.S. leaders must first accept certain distasteful facts -- such as Iran's ascendance as a regional power and the endurance of its regime -- and then ask how these can be accommodated. Despite its incendiary rhetoric and flamboyant claims, the Islamic Republic is not Nazi Germany. It is an opportunistic power seeking to assert predominance in its immediate neighborhood without recourse to war. Acknowledging that Iran is a rising power, the United States should open talks with a view to creating a framework to regulate Iran's influence, displaying a willingness to coexist with Iran while limiting its excesses. In other words, Washington should embrace a policy of d鴥nte.

As far-fetched as this call may seem, the United States does have experience dealing with seemingly intractable powers. In the late 1960s, as the U.S. presence in Asia was waning, China began to flex its muscles in its neighborhood. President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser, did not respond by denying the reality of Chinese power. They started talking to Beijing, soon winning China's assistance in ending the Vietnam War and in stabilizing East Asia. Similarly, the Nixon administration's d鴥nte policy toward the Soviet Union succeeded not only in averting conflict with Moscow but also in gaining its cooperation on critical arms control issues.

It is not entirely clear whether Iran would be as willing a negotiating partner today as China and the Soviet Union once were. But there is reason to hope so. Recent developments in the Middle East and Iran's own internal convulsions have placed Tehran at a critical juncture: Iran's emergence as the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf means that Tehran might finally alter its relationship with its great nemesis; it must move toward either coexistence or confrontation with the United States.

Throughout previous attempts at negotiations with Washington, the Iranian government had favored comprehensive talks over discussions of a single issue. In its latest response to the joint offer by the United States and the European Union last summer, Tehran stressed its readiness for "long-term cooperation in security, economic and political and energy areas in order to achieve sustainable security in the region and long-term energy security." It also argued that "to resolve the issue at hand in a sustainable manner, there would be no alternative except to recognize and remove the underlying roots and causes that have led the two sides to the current complicated position."

Getting past this "complicated position" may require Washington to pay closer attention to recent changes in Tehran. Iran's need for a foreign policy better adapted to changes in the Middle East, the regime's perennial factionalism, and, perhaps most significant, the rise of a new generation of leaders in Tehran have sparked important internal debates within the regime. If the United States plays its cards right, it could become an important arbiter in those deliberations.

 

Time for Détente with iran

Time for Détente with iran
Ray Takeyh
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007

Summary:  To tame the growing power of Iran, Washington must eschew military options, the prospect of conditional talks, and attempts to contain the regime. Instead, it should adopt a new policy of d鴥nte. By offering the pragmatists in Tehran a chance to resume diplomatic and economic relations with the United States, it could help them sideline the radicals and tip Iran's internal balance of power in their favor.

  Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic".

A RISING STAR

Over five years after the Bush administration vowed to transform the Middle East, the region is indeed profoundly different. Washington's misadventures in Iraq, the humbling of Israeli power in Lebanon, the rise of the once-marginalized Shiites, and the ascendance of Islamist parties have pushed the Middle East to the brink of chaos.

In the midst of the mess stands the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its regime has not only survived the U.S. onslaught but also managed to enhance Iran's influence in the region. Iran now lies at the center of the Middle East's major problems -- from the civil wars unfolding in Iraq and Lebanon to the security challenge of the Persian Gulf -- and it is hard to imagine any of them being resolved without Tehran's cooperation. Meanwhile, Tehran's power is being steadily enhanced by its nuclear program, which progresses unhindered despite regular protests from the international community.

This last development has put Washington in a bind. Ever since the revolution that toppled the shah in 1979, the United States has pursued a series of incoherent policies toward Tehran. At various points, it has tried to topple the regime -- even, on occasion, threatening military action. At others, it has sought to hold talks on a limited set of issues. Throughout, it has worked to box in Iran and to limit its influence in the region. But none of these approaches has worked, especially not containment, which is still the strategy of choice in the Iran policy debate.

If it hopes to tame Iran, the United States must rethink its strategy from the ground up. The Islamic Republic is not going away anytime soon, and its growing regional influence cannot be limited. Washington must eschew superficially appealing military options, the prospect of conditional talks, and its policy of containing Iran in favor of a new policy of d鴥nte. In particular, it should offer pragmatists in Tehran a chance to resume diplomatic and economic relations. Thus armed with the prospect of a new relationship with the United States, the pragmatists would be in a position to sideline the radicals in Tehran and try to tip the balance of power in their own favor. The sooner Washington recognizes these truths and finally normalizes relations with its most enduring Middle Eastern foe, the better.

NO GOOD OPTIONS

When discussing Iran, President George W. Bush commonly insists that "all options are on the table" -- a not-so-subtle reminder that Washington might use force against Tehran if all else fails. This threat overlooks the fact that the United States has no realistic military option against Iran. To protect its nuclear facilities from possible U.S. strikes, Iran has dispersed them throughout the country and placed them deep underground. Any U.S. attack would thus have to overcome both intelligence-related challenges (how to find the sites) and thorny logistical ones (how to hit them). (As the Iraq debacle has shown, U.S. intelligence is not always as reliable as it should be.) And even a successful military attack would not end the mullahs' nuclear ambitions; it would only motivate them to rebuild the destroyed facilities, and to do so with even less regard for Iran's treaty obligations.

What about holding a conditional dialogue, like the one proposed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice? In May 2006, Rice seemed to take a major step forward when she announced that the United States would be willing to participate in multilateral talks with Iran over the nuclear question if Iran suspended its uranium-enrichment activities. But the statement miscast the dispute between the United States and Iran as a simple problem of disarmament. In fact, the political and strategic differences between the two countries run much deeper -- and require a far more comprehensive approach.

Given these unpalatable realities, many U.S. policymakers have begun to gravitate toward what they see as the least objectionable option: containment. Their hope is that the systematic application of diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions will counter Tehran's nefarious designs in the short term and eventually usher in a new Iranian government more democratic and more amenable to U.S. interests.

The idea of containing Iran is not new; in one form or another, it has been the de facto policy of the United States since the inception of the Islamic Republic, and it has enjoyed broad bipartisan support in Washington. Yet to endorse it in good conscience today, one must answer important questions: Can a state that projects its influence through indirect means, such as supporting terrorism, financing proxies, and associating with foreign Shiite parties, truly be contained? Will other states in the region be willing to help the United States isolate Iran?

 

FOREIGN POLICY

FOREIGN POLICY

Iran Table of Contents

Iran's foreign policy was dramatically reversed following the Revolution. After World War II, Iranian leaders considered their country to be part of the Western alliance system. They actively cultivated relations with the United States, both as a means of protecting their country from perceived political pressures emanating from the Soviet Union and as a matter of genuine ideological conviction.

The Revolution, which was laden with anti-American rhetoric, brought new leaders to power who disapproved of Iran's relationship with the United States. The new leaders were convinced that Washington had tried to maintain the shah in power, despite the mass demonstrations calling for his downfall, and were deeply suspicious of American intentions toward their Revolution. These leaders believed that the United States was plotting to restore the shah to power and were unresponsive to persistent efforts by American diplomats to persuade them that the United States had no ill intentions toward the new regime.

The more radical revolutionaries were determined to eradicate all traces of American influence from Iran. Fearing that the provisional government was seeking an accommodation with the United States, some of these radicals precipitated the seizure of the American embassy in November 1979. Subsequently, they exploited the protracted hostage crisis between Tehran and Washington to achieve their objective of terminating normal relations with the United States. The severing of ties with the United States was regarded not only as essential for expunging American influence from the country but also was considered a prerequisite for implementing their revolutionary foreign policy ideology. This new ideology consisted of two concepts: export of revolution and independence from both the East and the West. By the time the hostage crisis was finally resolved in January 1981, these ideas were embraced by the entire political elite.

Concept of Export of Revolution

Problems with Current U.S. Policy

Iran

Volume 2, Number 42
August 1997

by Stephen Zunes, University of San Francisco
Editors: Tom Barry (IRC) and Martha Honey (IPS)

Key Points

• The strident anti-Americanism of Iran’s Islamic regime is a direct consequence of past U.S. interference in Iranian internal affairs.
• Ironically, U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic has hardened as the regime has become increasingly moderate.
• Iran has become a major obsession for U.S. policymakers, resulting in stringent economic sanctions and other measures.

Iran—with its strategic location, 60 million inhabitants, and control of 10% of the world’s oil reserves—continues to be a major concern to those who formulate U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. government has had contacts in Iran since early in the century, and major U.S. involvement dates back to 1953 when the CIA organized the overthrow of the country’s constitutional government. Over the next 25 years, the U.S. armed and trained the military and secret police of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, one of the most brutal dictators of his era.

The revolution that finally overthrew the monarchy in 1979 was (not surprisingly) stridently anti-American. With the secular opposition having largely been eliminated by the Shah’s repressive apparatus and the greater cohesion of the similarly suppressed religious opposition, the revolution took on an Islamic orientation. Within two years of its triumph, the revolution had assumed a brutal and reactionary character.

Radical students, backed by the government, seized more than fifty American hostages at the U.S. embassy in late 1979 and held them for 444 days, creating a major crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations that has yet to heal. Ironically, U.S. strategic cooperation with Iran was highest in the years that followed the hostage crisis, during the time when the revolutionary government reached its most radical and repressive stage. In 1981-86, the U.S. shipped arms clandestinely to the country. By helping to shore up the Iranian military, these shipments were part of the U.S. policy to promote the mutual destruction of Iran and Iraq. The secret arms transfers were also channeled to anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahadin. The U.S. also passed on names of Iranian leftists to government authorities, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of dissidents.

Despite this limited cooperation, the U.S. generally sided with Iraq during the eight-year war that began in 1980 when Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded western Iran. While the U.S. tolerated widespread attacks by Iraq against Iranian oil tankers during the war, the U.S. Navy intervened to protect Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil shipments from Iranian retaliation. This led to a series of armed engagements between the U.S. and Iran. Following one such encounter in 1988, a U.S. missile shot down an Iranian airliner on a regularly scheduled flight over international waters, killing 280 people.

The U.S. policy of playing Iran and Iraq off against one another in the 1980s resulted in a series of revelations embarrassing to successive administrations. Though Iran has moderated both its foreign and domestic policies considerably since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, U.S. hostility toward the Islamic Republic continues. Since 1993 U.S. policy has shifted to that of “dual containment,” seeking to isolate both Iran and Iraq.

Throughout the cold war, the U.S. sought to place the blame for violence and internal unrest in the Middle East (and in the third world in general) on the Soviet Union rather than on the failures of its own allies to govern fairly. This same pattern is emerging regarding Iran, with the U.S. now blaming the Islamic Republic for unrest in several Middle Eastern countries. The U.S. has also sought to link Iran with acts of terrorism throughout the region and beyond, both through its own agents and through local groups, and has accused Iran of launching military threats and acts of subversion against Arab Gulf monarchies.

Since May 1995, the U.S. has used its economic clout to isolate Iran, prohibiting all trade, trade financing, loans, and financial services to Iran. In August 1996, President Clinton signed a law that imposes a secondary boycott on foreign countries investing more than $40 million in Iran’s oil and natural gas industry. This law provides for an array of sanctions, including banning the sale of products of culpable firms in the United States. In addition, Congress has authorized $18 million for the budget of U.S. intelligence agencies to be spent on covert actions to undermine the government of Iran, once again making covert action a major facet of U.S. policy toward Iran.

Problems with Current U.S. Policy

Key Problems

• U.S. accusations regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions, links to terrorism, and aggressive designs against its neighbors have been greatly exaggerated.
• Certain aspects of U.S. policy are contrary both to international legal norms and to specific international agreements.
• U.S. policy has yet to result in any of the desired changes in Iranian practices and is actually retarding moderate forces within Iran.

The first major problem with U.S. policy is that, although the misdeeds of the Iranian regime are indeed numerous, most U.S. accusations against the Iranians seem to be grossly exaggerated and not substantially worse than the policies against some other nations in the region, including governments considered close allies of the United States. The result is a policy that is not only based on a series of false assumptions but one that also compromises U.S. credibility, even where the concerns have a legitimate basis.

The Clinton administration has shown no evidence to suggest an upsurge in Iranian-backed terrorism to justify its increased efforts at isolating Iran. Although Iran has certainly trained, funneled arms, and offered financial support to extremist Islamic groups and to the repressive government in Sudan, recent U.S. charges of direct Iranian responsibility for specific terrorist acts against Israeli and American targets are highly dubious. Indeed, Iranian support for such groups has declined significantly in recent years. Iran’s terrorism beyond its borders has always been primarily directed at exiled dissidents, not against the U.S. or Israel.

Similarly, Iran’s potential as a nuclear power has been greatly exaggerated, with the Clinton administration even overruling the more modest conclusions of its own agencies. The foreign diplomatic community in Teheran and the president of the International Atomic Energy Agency appear to agree that Iran’s motivations in building a nuclear reactor are entirely peaceful.

Iran’s immediate post-revolutionary zeal to export its ideology was short-lived as internal problems and outside threats deflected the attention of its leadership. In addition, Iranians are culturally and religiously very different from the Sunni Arabs that dominate the Middle East, particularly regarding the hierarchical structure of Shi’ism, which limits the revolution’s appeal as a model for other Middle Eastern states.

There is little evidence to suggest aggressive Iranian designs in the Gulf, either. Iran has not threatened—nor does it have any reason for provoking—a confrontation over sea lanes, and it is at least as dependent as its neighbors on unrestricted navigation. Instead, Iran has been dramatically reducing its military spending due to financial problems. Additionally, despite increased Iranian procurement of sophisticated missiles, Arab Gulf States have similar missile capabilities, serving with the U.S. Navy as an effective deterrent force.

The second major problem with U.S. policy is that efforts to isolate and overthrow the Iranian government are not based on legal grounds. The U.S. has avoided urging the UN to support its sanctions, because Washington knows there is no legal basis for such actions and it would thus fail to get any support. Unlike international sanctions against the former apartheid government of South Africa or the current military junta in Burma, sanctions against Iran are not predicated on significant legal or moral imperatives. As with similar extraterritorial efforts regarding Cuba, U.S. attempts to pressure other nations to get tough with Iran have alienated even America’s strongest allies, who consider such efforts to be in violation of World Trade Organization principles.

Similarly, U.S. efforts to subvert the Iranian government are contrary to international legal conventions that recognize sovereign rights and principles of nonintervention. They also directly counter the Algiers Declaration of 1981, under which the U.S. unequivocally pledged not to intervene politically or militarily in the internal affairs of Iran. In addition, the U.S. is obligated under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to allow signatory states in good standing (like Iran) to have access to peaceful nuclear technology.

The third major problem is that current U.S. policy fails to make the Iranian regime act more in accord with international standards of human rights. The idea that U.S sanctions can create sufficient economic pressure on Iran to topple the regime has never been realistic, because European and Japanese allies hold most of Iran’s foreign debt and would never cooperate in such a self-defeating policy. Clinton’s 1995 executive order banning trade with Iran took place without any prior consultation with other countries, who simply absorbed the trade to the detriment of American businesses.

Though popular support for the Iranian regime is meager and declining, U.S. policy has so offended nationalist sentiments that it has had the ironic impact of enhancing the credibility of the Iranian government. Each escalation in U.S sanctions, rhetoric, or military presence in the Gulf becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as Iranians consider themselves increasingly under siege. Political trends in Iran, such as the recent election of a relative moderate as the new president, appear to be going in a direction that should please U.S. policymakers. Yet U.S. policy has become increasing anti-Iranian, to the detriment of the very forces Washington wishes to encourage.

The double standards in U.S. policy are also a major factor behind the policy’s failure. The history of U.S. support for terrorist groups in Lebanon, Latin America, and elsewhere lends little credibility to Washington’s antiterrorist crusade against Iran. Likewise, U.S. support for Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Turkey, and other repressive countries in the region gives little credence to American concerns over Iran’s notorious human rights record.

Toward a New Foreign Policy

Key Recommendations

• Washington should broaden the base of U.S. policy formulation to include those with greater knowledge of the country and should increase coordination with other governments.
• The U.S. should craft more consistent policies regarding terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and human rights so as to regain credibility in challenging Iran on these issues.
• The U.S. should use both carrot and stick to support reasonable and realistic demands for change, apprising the Iranians of the policies that will result in certain rewards and punishments.

Given the nature of the Iranian regime, U.S. capability to affect Iranian government policies is quite limited. There are some changes in U.S. policy, however, that could still make a positive difference. The recent landslide election victory by Mohammed Khatemi (a leading moderate) to the Iranian presidency may force the Clinton administration to reevaluate its hard-line policy.

First, a broader coordination in the formulation of policy is essential. On a domestic level, Iran policy should no longer be directed primarily by the Pentagon and national security managers. Events in Iran over the decades have often been labeled surprising and unpredictable. Yet this is largely because U.S. policymakers have not taken the effort to learn about the country. Ironically, U.S.-imposed trade restrictions have made it difficult for Americans to learn more about Iran. U.S. foreign policy would benefit from greater consultation with the thousands of Iranian intellectuals now living in the U.S. and with Iranian experts in the State Department and among the nongovernmental community.

On an international level, the U.S. must reverse its unilateralism and coordinate policy with the Europeans and others who share U.S. concerns. Enforcing already-existing safeguards against nuclear proliferation would be one particularly important area for such efforts.

The U.S. must also seriously consider the perspectives of the democratic opposition in Iran. Although the Iranian opposition is somewhat divided, most—while supporting the arms embargo and opposing direct support for the government—strenuously oppose the U.S.-led economic embargo against Iran.

Second, the U.S. must scrap its double standards. Rather than targeting only Iran, the Clinton administration must pressure Saudi Arabia and other allied regimes in the Middle East to end their support of terrorism as well. Once the need for evenhandedness is recognized, there are a number of potential agreements that could be solidified between the U.S. and Iran. For example, Washington could propose ending its support for Israeli occupation forces in southern Lebanon in return for an end to Iranian support of the Lebanese Hezbollah.

Similarly, the best way to stop any potential procurement of nuclear weapons by Iran is to support the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. Such a move would require both the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces from the region and a pledge by Washington to pressure Israel to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Iran has long supported such a nuclear-free zone agreement.

Third, U.S. policy must include a carrot as well as a stick. Unfortunately, there has been a great reluctance to reward Iran for good behavior, in part as a reaction to the misguided policies of the Reagan administration. Indeed, recently, the U.S. has sounded as shrill, intransigent, and ideologically driven as the most radical ayatollahs. Instead, the U.S. should let the Iranians know just which policies of theirs will result in certain rewards and punishments.

Similarly, the U.S. must ascertain which demands for policy changes are reasonable and realistic. For example, given both the widespread support among Iranians for the Palestinians and the growing realization that the current framework of the negotiations are to the Palestinians’ disadvantage, insisting upon Iranian governmental support of the peace process is unrealistic. Likewise, U.S. insistence that Iran revoke its death sentence against Salman Rushdie may also be unreasonable, as the Iranian government claims that the notorious fatwa against the British author was made by an independent religious body that it cannot control.

Iran—due to its geography, the role of Shi’ite Islam, and its close cultural and religious links to neighboring states—will continue to play an important and unique role in the politics of the region based on its own perceived self-interests. Despite persistent efforts to isolate Iran, the U.S. cannot change that reality. It is important that Washington find a way to encourage Iran to become a more responsible member of the community of nations and to persuade it to end its internal repression against legitimate dissent. This will require, however, that the U.S. reevaluate its policies toward Iran and toward the region as a whole.

Stephen Zunes is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco.

Sources for more information

Organizations

Center for Iranian Research and Analysis (CIRA)
(Publishers of the CIRA Bulletin)
Spring Hill College
Mobile, AL 36608
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]

Middle East Research & Information Project
1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Ste. 119
Washington, DC 20005
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Website: http://www.merip.org/

Middle East Policy Council
1730 M Street NW, Ste. 512
Washington, DC 20036
Voice: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.mepc.org/

Publications

James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Skowcroft, and Richard Murphy, “Differentiated Containment,” Foreign Affairs, May 1997.

Anoushrvan Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (London: Routledge, 1995).

Electronic Middle East Insight, electronic newsletter. To subscribe, send an email to: [e-mail] with “Subscribe EMEI” in the body of the email.

Shireen Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

Michael Klare, Rogue States and International Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

Ellen Laipson, Gary Sick, and Richard Cottam, “Iran and the United States,” Middle East Policy, Vol. IV, No. 1-2, September 1995.

World Wide Web

Data Center
http://www.igc.apc.org/worldviews/wvmet.html

 

Key Decision Makers

4/25/05

Iran?s Foreign Policy & its Key Decision Makers

By Amir Ali Nourbakhsh

Introduction

? ? Iran is the most perplexing problem ... we face, for the following reasons: It is the only country in the world with two governments, and the only country in the world that has now had six elections since the first election of President Khatami [1997].? (Bill Clinton, 11 February 2005 issue of Executive Intelligence Review)

Former US President?s remarks point out the depth of the perplexity of Iran?s decision making procedure namely the existence of parallel institutions on the highest state level and the presence of a political pluralism. This reality makes Iran a unique phenomenon in international relations. Iran?s multi-faceted decision-making process, among other factors, has been the reason for numerous crises Iran has been entrapped in since the revolution of 1979. Nevertheless, it has also made predicting Tehran?s moves almost impossible for adversaries. This article identifies the formal and informal players who impact Iran?s foreign policy decision making and elaborates on the interaction of these institutions.     

There is a wide array of state, non-state and semi-state entities that influence foreign policy in Iran. The most important of these are elaborated below:


Velayat-e Faqih (Supreme Leader)    
In 1989 Iran?s Constitution was revised after ten years of political struggle following the 1979 revolution. This amendment bestowed on the Supreme Leader extensive powers in many domains including foreign policy. Serious public debates on the constitutional authorities of this institution, however, started after Khatami was elected president in 1997. A major point of dispute emphasized by reformists was the issue of ?dor-e batel? or ?vicious circle?. The Leader appoints six of the 12 members of the Guardian Council (GC) that can veto parliament?s (majles) legislation. The other six members are appointed by the head of the Judiciary?himself appointed by the Leader. These six have to be approved by the majles. But during the course of the reformist-dominated 6th majles (1999-2004) it turned out that a pro-reform parliament could not veto conservative candidates for those six positions. The conservative members were appointed despite the majles? opposition.

The GC also screens electoral candidates and can disqualify them for parliamentary, presidential and Assembly of Experts (AE) elections. The latter is the institution that appoints, supervises and, if need be, dismisses the Leader. Hence, the reformists? view has been that the line-up of the AE and the GC could theoretically create a gridlock as the Leader can potentially appoint people who would not question his conduct in the AE. This has virtually been the case.     

Moreover, the fact that the Leader appoints all commanders of the armed forces, Friday prayer leaders, the head of Radio and TV and can veto any decision on any level, has been a source of concern to the reform camp. The reformists? worries are justified when taking into consideration that the heads of all these institutions are affiliated with the conservative camp.         

The Leader?s office is an active institution in all affairs including foreign policy. His main foreign policy advisor is Ali Akbar Velayati who served as former president Rafsanjani?s foreign minister. Velayati?s personal ties to the Leader consolidated Velayati?s position as foreign minister under Rafsanjani and as the Leader?s foreign policy advisor today. Under Khatami, Velayati has influenced and undermined the decisions of the moderate foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi. All this underlines the Leader?s sensitivity towards foreign policy matters and that he has his ways of supervising and influencing this policy by his own trusted agents. 

Notably, Khatami?s foreign policy outlook vehemently differs from that of Rafsanjani and the Leader. Since Khatami?s presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has often been bypassed by more powerful parallel institutions. The nuclear issue is only one case in point. This is mainly due to the differences between Khatami?s moderate attitude toward the international community and Velayati?s more security and military-oriented mind-set based on his affiliation with the conservatives who advocate xenophobia, supra-nationalism and sectarianism.

This dichotomy is also accounted for by the close affiliation between the Leader and the security and military forces who are his appointees and serve the task of safeguarding and maintaining the system. As a senior analyst close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) puts it ?Some of the discussions on the nuclear issue take place exclusively among IRGC officials and they convey their conclusions directly to the Leader. These discussions are not tackled in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). It is bypassed.?           

This analyst argues that although the Leader usually pays more attention to security and military forces than other entities, on the nuclear issue he has shown that he listens predominantly to views of his representative in the SNSC, Hassan Rohani. Although Rohani may be one of the advisors whom Khamenei listens to most, Velayati is known as the Leader?s official mouthpiece. This said, Velayati?s comment last September on the nuclear issue is noteworthy: ?Whenever we stand firm and defend our righteous stands resolutely, they [the West] are forced to retreat and they have no alternatives. ? Those who are familiar with these countries and the history of international diplomacy never count on the promises of such countries."

All in all, Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say on sensitive foreign policy issues. The extent to which his final decision will be impacted by other individuals and institutions will depend on the following factors:  

 
? The level of his own awareness and knowledge of the issue at hand;
? The extent to which the issue is being perceived as security-oriented and related to the preservation of the regime;
? The extent to which various interest groups, official institutions and lobbies differ on the matter;    
? The extent to which other powerful figures and interest groups in foreign policy matters hold a firm opinion on the issue at hand;           


Against what may be the common perception, all political players including the parliament, Expediency Council (EC), SNSC, IRGC, MFA and powerful individuals can influence the position of the Leader, although to different extents. However, once the decision has been finalized, only a few dare challenge the decision.
This said, lobbying the Leader remains a priority for interest groups at least before the decision has been made. To the same extent that the IRGC managed to militarize the political situation during the 7th majles elections and exacerbate Iran?s international relations, the popular victory of Khatami in 1997 enabled the Khatami team to improve ties with the UK by assuring London that Iran would not pursue implementing the death decree on British author Salman Rushdie.
The falling out of favour of Khatami and his team with the public was mainly due to the conservatives? Machiavellian approach. It, however, showed that the conservatives needed to damage the Khatami team?s public standing before undermining him.      

Therefore, despite the Leader?s final say on foreign affair matters, the domestic power struggle, public opinion and security concerns can all tip the balance on the top decision making level. 

The Supreme National Security Council        
This Council was set up in 1989, following the revision of the Constitution. Its responsibilities are to determine the national defense-security policies within the framework of general policies laid down by the Leader. It coordinates political, intelligence, social, cultural and economic activities in relation to general defense/security policies and exploits material and non-material resources of the country for facing internal and external threats.    

The SNSC is chaired by the President and is the key national defence and security assessment body. A conservative figure close to Velayati argued that ?this Council also accelerates the slow decision-making process of Iran?s foreign policy in crisis situations.?

One of the institutions that can decide whether a major case should be forwarded to the SNSC is the President. However, the Leader can also delegate decisions to the SNSC. Although the decision making is through balloting, every decision by the SNSC has to be approved by the Leader. Upon his approval, the decision will be sent to the military section or to the foreign ministry.            

Hence, the MFA is not the main decision maker. The armed forces?in particular the IRGC?have significant impact on the decision making procedure. Moreover, the line-up and the political slant of the SNSC is of considerable importance for Iran?s foreign policy apparatus.        

Certain is that despite the unequal lobbying power of various factions, decision making in the SNSC?and generally in Iran?is not of cosmetics nature. It is real though not entirely democratic.       

Individual Influence    
Apart from the constitutional function of the SNSC, the role that Rohani has played in Iran?s post-revolutionary foreign policy underlines his personal power and influence in this domain.          

According to a senior political analyst close to the foreign policy apparatus, Rohani is perceived as one of the ?strongest men in Iran?s foreign policy. He is a complex character with a very good command of foreign policy issues. He never adopts an ideological view towards problems. He also serves as a balancer between intellectual and national forces on the one hand and conservatives and radicals on the other.?

Rohani has been retained in his position by the Leader for 16 years. Very often foreign officials visiting Iran have met with Rohani. The fact that Rohani was chosen as Iran?s front man on the nuclear issue instead of Khatami who is president and chairman of the SNSC shows Khamenei?s level of trust in Rohani as well as the small role the Executive Branch plays in crisis situations, especially if the mindset of the government differs from that of more powerful parallel institutions. In addition, Rohani?s personal connections to both ends of the political spectrum make him an appropriate negotiator who is less likely to fall victim to factional disputes.

Nevertheless, the reformists see the choice of Rohani as a major and unnecessary compromise by Khatami. Despite Rohani?s moderate stance on the nuclear issue the reformists believe his function as Iran?s chief negotiator on the nuclear issue a clear interference with the MFA and the executive branch.        


The Expediency Council         
The significance of the EC in Iran?s foreign policy is indirect but many-fold. Firstly, the Council is, as per the Constitution, a consultative body to the Leader on macro policies. So, the law requires the Leader to seek the opinion of this Council before making decisions on the macro-policies. Secondly, the EC?s significance is due to its constitutional authority as an arbitrator between the GC and the majles which has an impact on the formulation and pronouncement of foreign policy. On the nuclear issue, for instance, the establishment theoretically needs the Parliament?s ratification of the Additional Safeguard Protocol (ASP) because without it the Protocol is not legally binding. The EC, due to its flexible nature, could play a role in using the concept of ?expediency? to pass the Protocol as ratified. Thirdly, the political influence of chairman Rafsanjani, gives the Council exceptional weight in all macro-affairs. Fourthly, the EC accommodates Iran?s most influential political figures. This also makes the line-up of the Council politically a significant factor.

An interplay of all these four factors makes this Council an exceptional institution whose flexibilities and capabilities are still being discovered by the state. Nevertheless, the EC has to adhere to guidelines defined under Article 152 of the Iranian Constitution when dealing with foreign policy issues.  

A short glance at the evolution of the EC shows how factional interplays also affect the Council?s decision. This council was called into being in 1988, a year before Ayatollah Khomeini died. As an arbitrary body, it was established to settle legislative disputes between the majles and GC. The significance of the Council was marginal when first Ali Khamenei?the current Leader?headed the Council. It bore little importance because a lack of harmony between the government and majles could not have led to the empowerment of one faction under charismatic Khomeini.
After Ayatollah Khomeini's demise, Rafsanjani too was both president and head of the Council. Khomeini?s absence, however, made Rafsanjani more powerful a president than Khamenei was. The low profile of the council in light of the apolitical Iranian society prior to 1997 left unnoticed the controversy that the chairman of the executive branch also headed the institution that could veto and change decisions of the other (legislative) branch.  

Some two months before Khatami was elected president the number of the Council members rose from 12 to 35 overnight. This was necessary for the council that was going to undermine the incoming government and later the (6th) majles. Prior to this change the council members appointed their own chairman, while after the new reshuffle the Leader also appointed the head of the council and its secretary Mohsen Rezai; the former commander-in-chief of the IRGC. Today, the permanent and changeable members of the Council are appointed by the Leader. The rules for the Council must be formulated and approved by the Council members subject to confirmation by the Leader. In the past eight years, the council has made legislation which is contrary to the constitution. In a sense, the death of Khomeini was followed by empowerment of two political figures: Ali Khamenei as the Leader and Akbar Rafsanjani as head of the EC. On the contrary, President Khatami is the only president among the three who does not chair the EC.    

Although the EC features the most powerful figures of the Islamic Republic, in local parlance the EC is almost equal to the person of Rafsanjani. Many Iranians were not even aware of this institution during his presidency (1989-1997) as it never challenged his government or the conservative-dominated 5th majles. The common belief is that only after Khatami had been elected president did the conservative establishment use the Council as a legal channel to counter the reformists? decisions both in the legislative and executive branches. As an arbitrary body in the legislative branch, the EC during the 6th majles even made legislation which reformists condemned as unconstitutional.          

Apart from its extra-constitutional activities, the EC decisions have been a source of concern to the reformists due to its political composition. The EC?s line-up is similar to that of the SNSC in that it is dominated by the conservatives. The role of the few reformist members is more or less of a cosmetic nature. Some of these reformists have long refrained from attending EC meetings. The EC includes both those who currently hold an official position and those who are otherwise well-known and powerful personalities in the establishment.

Individual Influence    
Another source of concern to the reformists has been Rafsanjani?s shift towards the conservative camp. Both conservatives and reformists seem to agree on Rafsanjani?s influence. It is agreed that Rafsanjani is one of the most influential unofficial players in Iran?s foreign policy. Apart from the Expediency Council?s constitutional authority, the EC head meets every high ranking politician who visits Iran. ?The people they all want to meet are the president, the foreign minister and Mr. Rafsanjani mainly because of his character and influence,? argues Abbas Maleki a former member of the foreign ministry under Velayati.         

All said, the extent to which Rafsanjani will be able to influence Iran?s foreign policy will depend on the sources of his power: Rafsanjani was among the trusted allies of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. As one of the key figures in the course of the revolution, Rafsanjani was soon recognized as a politician with exceptional capabilities to arbitrate among ?insiders? and defeat ?outsiders? such as seculars and nationalists. As majles speaker, a two-time president and EC chairman, he was regarded as a moderate figure until the campaigns for the 6th majles elections started in 2000.

Then, he was tackled by the majority of reformists who accused him of oppression under his presidency and involvement in the elimination of Iranian dissidents. Ever since, Rafsanjani has sided with the conservatives.   

Financially, Rafsanjani comes from a wealthy family who prior to the revolution was active in the cultivation of pistachios. Today, there is more rumor than evidence on his strong economic influence. However, the general perception is that he is economically extremely wealthy and engaged in many state businesses through his relatives. Irrespective, Rafsanjani has a great bargaining power among conservatives of all walks such as the bazaar, the IRGC and the senior clergy. He is at the same time a regular Friday prayer leader in Tehran. This institution is controlled by the hardliners and is exclusively accountable to the Leader. The reformists have also learnt that he should be handled with caution; keeping peace with Rafsanjani is politically healthier than attacking him.   

He has close ties with the IRGC and the hardliners. By siding with the conservatives, Rafsanjani has managed to retain his political interests. ?He wants to retain his relevance and be an arbitrator between the conservatives and reformists. Rafsanjani operates in a way that different forces come to him and try to resolve their problems through him. At the same time, he is also feared by rivals as he also knows how to produce crises.?, says a political analyst close to the EC.              

All this makes him a powerful lobbyist and a well-connected politician. Despite all this, after having fallen out of favour with the reformists, Rafsanjani has found it difficult to use his power to influence public opinion and gain back the full support of the reform camp. Nevertheless, among insiders, he is still a powerful figure with full control over Iran?s foreign affairs, despite the fact that the neo-conservatives of the 7th majles are now also against him as a presidential candidate.   

Executive Branch: Foreign Ministry & Presidency      
The role of the executive branch in Iran?s foreign policy is limited but not necessarily insignificant. It is crucial in the formal decision making process, in non-crisis situations or vis-୶is countries that have little security significance for Iran and in cases where the system needs a show of legitimacy. This is true particularly of the Khatami era.

From a domestic viewpoint, the strong public base of the incoming government in 1997 enabled the MFA to take the lead in the foreign policy for some years. The internationalist camp in the MFA enabled the state to partly undo Iran?s failure to respond to the EU?s critical dialogue policies with Iran. The restoration of ties with the EU which had reached rock bottom in the last days of Rafsanjani?s presidency is entirely due to Khatami?s foreign policy. So, despite the Executive Branch?s limited role, two factors allowed it to improve ties with the EU and even try a rapprochement with the US. One was Khatami?s instrumental use of his popularity as a source of legitimacy. The other was the fact that d鴥nte with the West was not considered a threat to the Islamic Republic under Khatami. In 1997, the EU was regarded as one of Iran?s few channels to reduce US pressure on Iran.           

The Khatami team?s upper hand, however, was only tolerated until the reform movement was domestically weakened, external crises escalated and the domestic situation was militarized as the nuclear issue intensified. So, if the reformists had been able to keep their public support by being more resistance to the conservatives, Khatami?s foreign policy team might have been more successful in its d鴥nte towards the West. Thus, the conservatives first needed to damage Khatami?s public image before taking over foreign policy.        

In terms of functionality, the president?s and the MFA?s impact on foreign affairs differs from case to case. For instance, one of the areas directly impacted by the domestic power struggle is the diminished influence of the Ministry of Information. Under Khatami, this ministry has become more focused and functional. It refrains from interference in foreign policy matters.          

Before the Khatami era, the Information Ministry under Ali Fallahian acted in a rogue manner. The reforms carried out by Khatami?s team in the beginning (1998-1999) reduced the impact of security forces on foreign policy as they prevented the interference of at least one security mindset in Iran?s foreign affairs. Although difficult to predict, a powerful security squad dominated by rogue elements?responsible for the serial killings of Iranian dissidents in 1998?would have certainly been counterproductive to the current political face-off between Iran and the international community.       

Still today, in affairs related to neighbouring states for instance, the role of the government decreases as it becomes one of the numerous players. In such cases, the IRGC?s profile on countries that have a security significance for Iran increases.

By the same token, issues related to ?Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, Palestine, Egypt, US, UK, Lebanon and the IAEA fall into the Leader?s and IRGC domain. The MFA?s role in these areas is marginal. The MFA acts more effectively in areas where Iran has had less experience such as international organizations. On regional issues, the foreign ministry has almost no role. ? The more ideological the issue, the greater role the IRGC and Leader?s office play.  

The Executive & the Nuclear Crisis     
On sensitive security issues such as the nuclear program and the development of missile technology the Khatami administration has played an insignificant role. Most probably, Khatami himself might have been uninformed about certain developments, especially with regards to the nuclear issue. In 1999, Khatami unsuccessfully demanded that the cabinet be given absolute decision-making power in all areas of policy, including foreign policy. He requested the Ministry of Finance to supervise activities of all foundations which are involved in extra-state activities. His request was denied. Consequently, a number of sensitive projects, e.g. the nuclear program, were removed from his purview. According to a spokesperson for Khatami: ?Policy decisions on this [nuclear] matter are not in the hands of the government.?   

Individual Influence    
Despite the executive branch?s limited influence on foreign policy in general, it would be wrong to disregard the personal power of Khatami in Iran?s international relations. Observers agree that the result of the 1997 presidential election, confirmed in 2001, have made Khatami the source of the Islamic Republic?s legitimacy. The persistence of some conservatives on persuading Khatami to run for re-election in 2001, their criticism of his resignation threats in protest to the conservatives policies and the fact that the West still regards Khatami as a moderate personality have made him an asset to the system. While observers have entirely focused on his failures, there is no assessment on what Iran?s international standing would have been without Khatami. Despite his increasingly limited influence, Khatami is still a moderating factor influencing Iran?s foreign policy.         

The developments of the past seven years have, thus, made Khatami a powerful player in Iran?s foreign policy providing him with personal links to other stakeholders such as the Leader, Rafsanjani and Rohani. Nevertheless, Khatami?s influence remains limited in comparison with that of others as his source of power does not derive from connections to traditional forces that control economic, political, security and military monopolies in Iran. On sensitive security issues such as the nuclear program and the development of missile technology the Khatami administration has not played a significant role. Most probably, Khatami himself has been uninformed about certain developments, especially with regards to the nuclear issue. Khatami?s government has thus been more involved in implementation and not design of the state?s policies. Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, the government spokesman, said in late June that Khatami?s government was out of the nuclear issue. He said: ?The Government has no say in this matter. Hojjatoleslam Rohani talks [to the IAEA or Europe], decides and informs. The government just carries out what is decided and told to execute, like introducing the ASP to the majles and things like that?.   


The Parliament (Majles)         
The role of the Iranian parliament in foreign policy decision-making is probably the most controversial. While Mahmoud Sariolghalam, a senior political analyst, gives the majles a share of 5% , former pro-reform majles member Mohsen Mirdamadi argues that ?the influence of the majles depends on the extent to which it tries to impose itself. If it imposes itself, [even] the Supreme Leader will accept its decisions.? The Iranian Constitution authorizes the majles to make decisions, so deputies are free to remark on foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, the parliamentary authority in foreign relations is confined by Article 152 of the Constitution explained earlier. Then again, the majles? power to call for a referendum under a majority vote of deputies provides the House with a powerful pressure leverage even if the Leader has to approve the call for referendum. In addition, the 1989 revision of the Constitution diminished the parliament?s influence on foreign policy matters as both the EC and the Leader gained increased prominence in this regard.       

As for the nuclear issue, however, the majles is a key instrument. Guessing has been going on as to whether the conservative parliamentarians will ratify the ASP. Although, as suggested by Maleki, Iran?s leadership is likely to find a way to convince the majles to ratify the Protocol when and if the time comes, it will still be a difficult task due to the majles' hard stance on the nuclear issue.   

On 10 August 2004, conservative lawmakers threatened Kharrazi with impeachment for his alleged mishandling of Iran's nuclear dossier. Neo-conservative deputies questioned why Iran had surrendered to the demands of the Europeans and the West. This was in reference to Iran?s meeting with France, Germany and Britain last July where the Europeans continued their effort to have Iran stop work on its nuclear fuel cycle.   

These majles deputies asked Kharrazi why Iran had agreed to allow tougher inspections under the additional protocol while the text had not yet been ratified by the parliament.   

In addition to these threats, the parliamentary commission for national security and foreign affairs tried to force Khatami?s government to restart its uranium enrichment program. Guaranteeing deputies that Iran would never give up its right to have peaceful nuclear energy, Kharrazi stated that the parliament would have the final say on the ratification or the refusal of the protocol.           

Even Rohani as the Leader?s representative was harshly rebuked by the same parliament. This shows that some hardliner deputies may even be prepared to indirectly challenge the Leader on the issue by questioning his representative. Although a direct challenge seems rather out of the question, a continuation of such approach may intimidate or delay an intervention by the Leader. This said, the role of the majles on foreign policy matters is indirect, predominantly as a pressure leverage and depends on the faction dominating it.       

Informal Mechanism   
Most of the informal channels influencing foreign policy are exclusive to the conservatives. These channels are controlled by a loose bond of a wide variety of individuals and organizations with political and often economic ambitions. From the factional viewpoint, this current ranges from traditional conservative individuals to hardliners and members of the armed forces. From a social perspective, individuals range from a wealthy and traditional mercantile stratum to a clerical community supported by youth from the lower-income classes. The main concern of this political current is to maintain the dominance of interest groups in the power structure through which it has managed to manipulate the country?s policies.          

This state of affairs explains why often personal networks are stronger than institutional power. Through family relations, educational affiliation, common war experiences and revolutionary backgrounds individuals can use prot駩s in related institutions to exercise influence. However, this does not mean that lower social classes, no matter how committed to the revolution or influential in domestic affairs, can easily tip the balance in foreign affairs.   

The mechanism of these groups to influence foreign policy is often indirect. Through demonstrations, chanting death slogans to certain states, the use of official and semi official channels such as mosques, Friday prayers, and state run TV and Radio, the paramilitary Basij or IRGC gatherings, these mainly xenophobic forces can make their voices heard both domestically and internationally. This is while internationalist forces of the Islamic Republic are deprived of means of mobilizing demonstrations and expressing themselves through the same variety of channels.       

These xenophobic forces? privileged access to media and other facilities often paves the ground for interest groups to argue that public opinion is behind their policies. Thus, by monopolizing public opinion, justification is provided for those who have an interest in radicalizing the domestic atmosphere. By the same token, if reformists manage to create a momentum against the hardliners? interests by means of their own limited media, the conservatives will use their channels usually by accusing them of treason and foreign dependence. Given their facilities, the conservatives have been more successful in undoing efforts to promote internationalism than the reformists have been in creating such momentum.           

 

Armed & Security Forces        
Unlike the regular army, the IRGC and its security units are active in manipulating Iran?s foreign policy. Officially, the IRGC?s input to foreign policy is through its commander?s membership in the SNSC. In areas with an impact on Iran?s defence policies, the IRGC has its own perspective. But in contrast to what is generally perceived, the IRGC, like all other political groups, needs to struggle for its opinions. According to Maleki, ?the problem is that due to [Khatami?s] foreign ministry?s weak operation, its officials are trying to blame others for the ministry?s poor conduct. Whenever the MFA has acted strongly others have complied. ... IRGC does not have a big say in foreign policy matters.?          

On this issue, the conservatives and reformists seem to agree. Mirdamadi argues along the same lines. In Iran?s foreign policy, ?if the [Foreign] Ministry acts weakly, other players take over.? Hence, it can be deduced that the IRGC does not necessarily have full influence on the Leader in foreign policy matters. However, in issues where he has ?no concrete opinion, those forces who are closer to him, such as the armed forces, may have a better chance of tipping the balance to their liking, although not always and not entirely." Notably, the nuclear issue is certainly among those areas where Khamenei does indeed have a strong opinion of his own.

Nevertheless, the official and less formal interferences of the IRGC and its paramilitary subsidiary, the Basij, in Iran?s foreign and domestic affairs through their press, unauthorized demonstrations, threats and Friday prayers have been evident in the past years. Although officially, their input is ?only? through a single vote in the SNSC, the following examples clarify how informally the IRGC can manipulate foreign policy in Iran:          

? The IRGC flexes its muscles at advisory meetings with the Supreme Leader and the presidential office.     
? It carries discussions with the majles? foreign and security committees.
? In Iran?s defence policies where the Khatami administration has emphasized d鴥nte vis-୶is another state, military commanders have weakened this d鴥nte by xenophobic speeches attacking and threatening Western forces. The Judiciary which subscribes to the same mindset has often annulled the government?s efforts to reduce international pressure on Iran?s human rights conditions. For instance, the attacks on the US tourists? bus in 1998 after Khatami?s efforts to reduce tensions with the US are among the numerous cases where vigilantes have undermined Khatami?s d鴥nte.  

Hence, the assessment that the IRGC enjoys only one vote in the SNSC regarding foreign policy is correct in terms of the formal decision-making process. However, the IRGC and like-minded institutions?the Judiciary, State Radio and TV, some hardliner dailies, Friday prayers and Ansar-e Hizbollah?strongly influence the entire decision-making, lobbying and negotiating procedure until the eventual decision has been pronounced. On defence, military, and operational matters, such as the nuclear crisis, the IRGC has a dominant position, while the army?s role remains marginal. In any issue that has a policy formulation aspect, the IRGC is important. The difference with the army is that the IRGC regards itself as the owner of the state. All this makes the IRGC much more than an institution with one formal vote on the SNSC.

Individual Influence in the IRGC         
Personal relations and influences of Iran?s military figures are of considerable importance in foreign policy matters. For instance, the former commander-in-chief of the IRGC, Mohsen Rezai, who now serves as the secretary of the EC was removed from his position after Khatami came to power. His replacement, contrary to what many believe, was not necessarily a consequence of the reform movement. Certain conservative forces were considering Rezai as a future politician and potential presidential candidate. Moreover, given his increasing personal power, his leave from the IRGC made the Guards more submissive to Leader Khamenei. Rezai was a powerful personality who received his influence from his revolutionary record under Khomeini. This is while his replacement, Yahya Rahim Safavi, and his hard-line deputy, Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, receive their power through the direct decree of Mr. Khamenei.         

This said, Safavi?s direct influence on foreign policy as IRGC head is limited and subject to Khamenei?s approval, while Rezai?who still enjoys support in the IRGC?is seated in a Council under the supervision of Rafsanjani who is one of the country?s most powerful men in foreign policy. Being promised support as conservatives? presidential candidate, Rezai has ceased being a potential military leader in exchange for attaining a strong political position.           

Hence, with Rezai out of the IRGC, this institution is now run by one of the Leader?s prot駩s. This fact firstly reduces the number of institutions that think independently (independent thinkers) and secondly, adds to the number of personalities who have a master-apprentice (morid-moradi) relation with the Leader.

A comment by Zolqadr clarifies. He was asked whether the Basij had a special policy for Iraq. He replied: ?We are awaiting the country?s foreign policy decisions. We are entirely obedient to the foreign policy decisions of Velayat-e Faqih and the Supreme Leader. We always listen to his orders and we carry out his order with all our hearts. Now we are awaiting his orders.? This is while, Rezai, during the last years as Commander-in-chief of IRGC, had numerous conflicts with the Leader because of Mr. Khamenei?s appointment of his prot駩s to positions within the Guards.     

Defence Ministry         
Iran?s Defence Minister, Ali Shamkhani, is also one of the few personalities who plays a significant role in Iran?s foreign policy. Conservative-leaning Shamkhani admits that among the military forces, ?some believe power means war mongering, while others see giving concessions as equivalent to peace. I choose a way in between which is active deterrence.? Shamkhani?s role as a facilitator between military hard and soft liners is possible because of his personal link to the Leader. Otherwise his attempts to arbitrate between the two poles would not have been successful.

Originally an Iranian Arab from the Southern province of Khouzestan, Shamkhani received his reputation as a war veteran who at the same time was able to control the Arab speaking population during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). Today, as one of the Leader?s trusted figures, Shamkhani is one of the Ministers whom Khatami accepted reluctantly. However, Shamkhani has been trying to mediate between the administration and other armed forces such as the IRGC which has acted without the administration?s approval on foreign policy matters; albeit at times in a rogue fashion.


The choice of Shamkhani adds to the number of second generation revolutionary elite who are becoming more influential in the decision-making process but think at the same time in line with the Leader?s foreign policy doctrines or, in other words, have a morid-moradi relationship to him.            

Internal Affairs of the Armed Forces   
The armed forces officially do not receive orders from the defence ministry. Their internal decision-making procedure is through interaction with other military forces. Their views are expressed in the EC and considered in the macro-policies of the state. Upon approval by the Leader, these policies are forwarded to the armed forces. The role of the defence ministry in formulating defence policies lies in a committee of the SNSC headed by the Minister of Defence. Moreover, within the armed forces, there is also a supreme council where the defence minister is a member enjoying one vote. All this is part of the multiple decision-making entities which make coordination with the foreign ministry more difficult both due to the large number of the institutions involved and factional challenges.           

Armed Forces & the Media     
As for the impact of conservative media on foreign policy, one could refer to a couple of periodicals such as Jomhouri-ye Eslami, Resalat, Keyhan and Ya Lesarat. All four promoted a militarization of the domestic scene following the 7th majles elections, hoping it would result in a clamp down on reforms.           

Following Maleki?s classification, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-charge of Keyhan, is one of the personalities who exert informal influence on foreign policy issues. As for the media, in Iran there is a concern (among political players) that Keyhan might tackle an issue. ?Many activists try not to be targeted by Keyhan. The daily?s conduct, however, is influenced by the character of Mr. Shariatmadari.? Argues Maleki.  

During the past years, the reform camp has condemned Shariatmadari as an ex-intelligence and IRGC agent responsible for the violent interrogation of many analysts. Rejecting all allegations as pure fabrication, Shariatmadari does not deny his power to crush the ?enemies of state?. He is appointed by the Leader as head of the Keyhan Institution and the daily newspaper and considers himself a life-time ally of the Leader. Most of Keyhan?s attacks on reformists have been based on security issues and charges of defying Ayatollah Khamenei and the IRGC. According to Maleki, ?it is known that Keyhan defends revolutionary values. Even if it is wrong, people agree that Shariatmadari is defending the revolution. ? Keyhan characteristically takes a critical view on everything. When asked why, he [Shariatmadari] says criticism makes the decision makers think twice before acting. This forces them to consider more carefully the consequences of their decisions. Keyhan today remains one of the most die hard supporters of Iran withdrawing from the NPT.       

The audience of Keyhan mainly consists of hardliners from the para-military Basij, IRGC families but also die hard supporters of the system who believe in the concept of Velayat-e Faqih. Keyhan, but also Friday prayer leaders with whom Keyhan often works in tandem, have been successful in shaping the opinion of this social layer, especially on the nuclear issue. Keyhan?s reflections can be seen in the demonstrations of lower income youth after Friday sermons. Keyhan may well relent?however reluctantly?to decisions on the top level regarding the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, it has a manipulating role in the mindset of the radical Basijis and IRGC affiliates who may not accept as easily as Keyhan top decisions, if found to be against revolutionary values.         

Keyhan may not have a direct impact on foreign policy decisions, but certainly serves as leverage against the moderate attitudes of the government making certain decision making procedures longer, more difficult and occasionally impossible to make. Keyhan evening daily was one of the first institutions that called on the authorities to consider withdrawing from the NPT. In Shariatmadari?s own words: "The joint statement shows the true nature and objectives of America and its (European) allies to deny the Islamic Republic access to nuclear technology. We shall no doubt reach the point where in order to safeguard our sovereignty and interests, exit from the NPT as the only logical and legal choice. This is a decision we should have made much earlier. It is not too late. ... Fortunately, the fundamentalist 7th majles is determined not to approve the Additional Protocol and one might hope that it will also consider getting Iran out of the NPT.? These statements clearly show how Keyhan influences the opinions of its readers, like-minded officials and majles deputies. That Shariatmadari is an appointee of the Leader gives Keyhan the possibility to claim it represents the Leader?s views, although the Leader also has more moderate representatives.         

Despite his obedience of the system?s final decision, Shariatmadari certainly ranks among those players who independently develop their own political mindset and may even challenge the leadership?s decisions. Shariatmadari?s Keyhan is a powerful instrument in manipulating Friday prayers, Basijis and Ansar-e Hezbollah, but can also influence and intimidate ranks on higher levels, not only but especially among the reformists. The reformists consider Keyhan and its affiliates as part of what they call the Leader?s strategy of ?nasr-e beh rob?e? which means victory ?through intimidation?.

Conclusion
The seal of approval on foreign policy decisions lies with the Supreme Leader.
Firstly, his exclusive right on the decision of many state affairs, including foreign policy, is founded in the Iranian Constitution. The 1989 amendments bestowed upon the institution of the Velayat-e Faqih even more rights than Khomeini constitutionally enjoyed.

Secondly, the line-up of the key institutions that play a chief role in Iran?s foreign policy decision making are important factors in this regard. By accommodating powerful figures, the EC reduces the number of players in the decision making process. Each of these figures could have potentially been a manipulator in top decision making had they acted independently. Today, all these actors are encouraged by the EC's enhanced authorities and are therefore able to reach a consensus and project their decision collectively through the Council. In a sense, the constitutional amendments that enhanced the authorities of this Council increased incentives for Iran?s top elite to opt for consensus rather than individual or rogue behaviour which would have challenged the Leader?s position.   

Thirdly, the political developments of the past eight years have reinforced the Leader?s authorities. The line-ups of institutions such as the EC or the SNSC enhance possibilities that the final decision will be in line with the Leader?s mindset. The political developments of the past years not only gradually weakened the full steam activities of the Khatami team, but also curtailed to an extent the powers of those conservatives who were emerging to new power monopolies. These are independent thinkers like Mohsen Rezai. Hence, the outcome of political events since 1997 has been that the Leader-loyalists have outnumbered the conservative independent thinkers within the decision-making forums.        

In addition to all this, Khamenei?s standing gives him the authority to occasionally call on his advisors to reconsider their views, if he does not entirely agree with a proposal which he would reluctantly veto. In the past, the reformists? public standing has been used to pressure the hardliners in the same way that the military establishment has been engaged to intimidate the reformists to tone down their criticisms. In most cases, however, the latter has been the case, which has been in the interest of the Leader.           

All this, however, does not mean that he makes all the decisions. The Leader?s high position and his power to delegate authority to other players make him the target of all formal and informal interest groups, lobbyists and pressure leverages. Hence, despite all his prestige, constitutional and political powers, he still finds it difficult and is often reluctant to step out of the ?agreed? framework and veto matters which go against the majority votes of the other main players. However, he would do so, if he found it necessary. Note, the majority of these forces do not necessarily reflect the national majority.          

The rules of engagement are becoming, however, more difficult to follow. Iran?s perplexing decision making system is made more complicated by a number of socio-political and economic factors. The existing level of political pluralism, political and economic interests of a wide array of not like-minded elite, public opinion, the international community and superpowers? power projection are among these factors. Therefore, it is not too far-fetched to argue that Iran?s only foreign policy and national interest constant has been the survival of the regime.        

As decision-making becomes difficult, players like Khamenei, Rafsanjani, Khatami, Rezai and Shariatmadari privately disagree with each other. This is exactly where the domestic infightings come in. Each player has his own pressure leverages, be it the public opinion, the international community, pressure groups and rogue elements. Victory, obviously, depends on how these players can make use of their own instruments, e.g. radicalize or militarize the political atmosphere, use democratic concepts, accuse others of endangering the entirety of the system, etc. As mentioned before, the more security-oriented the situation is perceived, the easier for the hard-line forces to gain an upper hand.                       

All in all, the decision-making process in Iran?s foreign policy could be summarized by the following points:

1. The Leader certainly has a dominant role in the decision making procedure.       
2. Decision making in Iran, yet, is not a fa硤e for preset policies although it is not an entirely democratic procedure. 
3. The Leader is, hence, influenced by interest groups and is more flexible than generally believed.  
4. Personalities have often as much power in the decision making as institutions.  
5. While the conservative personalities have the upper hand, the reformists still stand chances of influencing the final decision.           
6. Ideology has ceased to play a dominant role in Iran?s foreign policy decision making.
7. Factors such as international community, foreign pressure, human rights, public standing, legitimacy, personal connections, rogue activism and pressure groups all can play important roles in the decision-making procedure though to different extents.

Final word      
Mohammad Khatami has been Iran?s first president who received his power and acceptability directly and only through the support of the people without the backing of one specific influential revolutionary figure. Hence, the loss of his popularity has also paved the grounds for his weakness in making crucial decisions. Nevertheless, his experience by no means indicates that decision-making in Iran is doomed to what turned out the fate of his decisions. This is while certain forces in Iran prefer the image that Khatami?s failure proves that decisions in Iran are predetermined and cannot be manipulated. This is a political insinuation. If decisions were preset in Iran, the power struggle would not have been as harsh in the past eight years.
Contrary to what appears to be the case, Iranian politics remain highly dynamic, precarious and more flexible than many observers believe. Therefore, irrespective of who will be elected Iran?s next president, the new presidential tenure of 2005-2009 will have in store changes in the decision-making processes. This article showed how and why this is possible. 

Mr. Amir Ali Nourbakhsh is a frequent contributor to many publications and conference on social and political issues in Iran. He is the editor of the political and economic monthly, Iran Focus, published by the London-based Middle East and North African Survey (MENAS Associates). Mr. Nourbakhsh wrote this article specially for the Tharwa Project.

ساختار، فرآيند و افراد در سياست خارجي ايران

Iran's Foreign Policy

فصل ششم:

                ساختار، فرآيند و افراد در سياست خارجي ايران

 

 

1.                   ساختار سياسي ايران

ايران يكي از مهمترين كشورهاي جهان بلحاظ استراتژيكي و ژئوپليتيكي است.[1] از نقاط قوت اين كشور مي توان به همسايگي با 15 كشور در مرزهاي خاكي و آبي خود اشاره داشت[2].  اين كشور سومين دارنده ذخائر نفت خام در جهان پس از عربستان سعودي و عراق، و دومين دارنده ذخائر گاز جهان پس از فدراسيون روسيه است. ايران در سال 2000 از فروش نفت، مبلغ 16 ميليارد دلار و در سال 2001، مبلغ 22 ميليارد دلار درآمد داشته است[3]. اين كشور در حدود 35000 مگاوات، ظرفيت توليد الكتريسته نصب شده داشته و داراي سدهاي عظيمي بر وري رودخانه هاي كشور مي باشد.

طبيعت عمومي ساختار قدرت در نظام جمهوري اسلامي ايران روشن و مانند ساير اكثر كشورهاست. اما داراي ظرافت ها و پيچيدگيهايي است كه بيشتر بايد بدان ها توجه نمود. از يك سو، فلسفه حكومت در ايران با ديگر كشورها مشترك است. قدرت حكومتي در ايران به سه بخش تقسيم شده و قواي مقننه، مجريه و قضائيه وجود دارند. از سوي ديگر، پروسه سياسي در ايران داراي ساختار و سلسله مراتب خاص خود است كه اين مبحث سعي مي كند گوشه اي از آن را منعكس نمايد.

در نظام دمكراسي پارلماني در ايران، 290 نماينده مجلس براي چهار سال بوسيله مردم برگزيده مي شوند. رئيس جمهور توسط مردم براي چهار سال انتخاب مي شود كه حداكثر دوبار يك شخص بصورت متوالي مي تواند رئيس جمهور شود. رئيس جمهور بعنوان رئيس اجرائي حكومت، مسئوليت مديريت بر همه امور جاري كشور را داراست. رئيس جمهور 22 وزير را به پارلمان پيشنهاد مي نمايد. وزراء بصورت مستقيم در برابر مجلس پاسخگو هستند.

اما آنچه كه در نظام ايران متفاوت است، ماهيت مذهبي آن است. 86 نفر از علماي اسلامي توسط مردم بعنوان اعضاي مجلس خبرگان به مدت 8 سال انتخاب مي شوند. سپس اين نهاد، رهبر عالي انقلاب اسلامي را انتخاب كرده و در طول دوره نسبت به عملكرد او نظارت مي نمايد. رهبر انقلاب رئيس قوه قضائيه را منصوب مي نمايد كه كليه دادگاه هاي عمومي، انقلاب و نظامي را زير نظر دارد. رهبري علاوه بر اين فرماندهي نيروهاي مسلح را نيز به عهده دارد[4].

شوراي نگهبان، نهادي است كه مسئوليت انطباق مصوبات مجلس را با قوانين اسلامي داراست. اين نهاد همچنين تفسير قانون اساسي را به عهده داشته و نظارت بر حسن انجام انتخابات رياست جمهوري، پارلمان و مجلس خبرگان به عهده اوست.

مجمع تشخيص مصلحت نظام در پس از تغييراتي كه در قانون اساسي در سال 1367 بوجود آمد، تاسيس شد. همه 38 عضو اين شورا، از تفكرات سياسي مختلف، احزاب و جمعيت هاي متفاوت[5] توسط رهبري منصوب مي گردند[6]. مسئوليت هاي مجمع تشخيص مصلحت عبارت است از پيدا كردن راه هايي براي رفع بن بست مابين پارلمان و شوراي نگهبان در صورت لزوم، مشاوره دادن به رهبري و پيشنهاد نمودن خطوط كلي سياست هاي نظام جمهوري اسلامي.

شوراي عالي امنيت ملي نيز در پس از بازنگري در قانون اساسي بوجود آمد. رئيس جمهور، رياست شوراي عالي را به عهده داشته و اين شورا تلفيقي از نهادهاي استراتژيك جمهوري اسلامي ايران است. دو نماينده از طرف مقام معظم رهبري، روساي سه قوه (رئيس جمهور، سخنگوي مجلس و رئيس قوه قضائيه)، وزراي امور خارجه، كشور، اطلاعات، دفاع و فرماندهان نيروهاي مسلح مانند ارتش و سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامي اعضاي اين شورا هستند. شوراي عالي، سياست خارجي، سياست دفاعي و سياست هاي امنيتي نظام را تدوين مي نمايد. مصوبات شورا پس از تائيد رهبري قابل اجراست.

سياست خارجي جمهوري اسلامي، صحنه برخورد و تعامل واقع گرايي و آرمانگرايي است. از يكسو، انقلاب اسلامي، يك انقلاب ايدئولوژيك بوده و الزامات و اهداف مكتبي خود را بدنبال دارد و از سوي ديگر ايران كشوري است همچون ديگر ملت-كشورها[7] با محدوديت ها و فرصت هاي خاص خود. آيا اين دو با يكديگر در تنازع دائمي هستند؟ و يا مي توان آنها را در كنار هم داشت؟ "مقصد يك سياست خارجي متكي بر ايدئولوژي، تاثيرگذاري بر محيط و در نهايت، تغيير آن مطابق آمال خويش است. سياست خارجي جمهوري اسلامي ايران، عليرغم جواني و كم تجربگي، بواسطه اصول انقلاب، اهداف عظيم و والايي را در عرصه اي به وسعت سراسر جهان پيش روي خود دارد"[8]. در مقابل، سياست واقع گرا، جولانگاه عينيات و محاسبات مادي است. ملاحظات و مقدورات برآن حاكم است. شكست و پيروزي، دو واژه پررنگ و تلالوئي است كه از يكي پرهيز و به سوي ديگري گام برداشته مي شود. فضيلت، واژه غيرقابل فهمي است كه در اهداف سياست واقع گرا راه نمييابد[9]. در اين نوشته فرض مي كنيم كه يك نظام متكي بر ايدئولوژي، چاره اي جز تلفيق واقع گرايي و آرمانخواهي ندارد تا علاوه بر حفظ و پيشرفت خود، در مسير تحقق خواستهاي نهايي آرمانهايش نيز كوشش كند و چنانكه گفته شد، لاجرم اين كوشش در محدوده توان و مقدورات نظام براي تضمين ادامه حيات آينده آن صورت مي گيرد. در عين حال برخي از انديشمندان بر اين عقيده اند كه سياست خارجي جمهوري اسلامي ايران به تدريج عقلايي تر و در عين حال قابل تطبيق با تئوري هاي روابط بين الملل ميشود[10].

قانون اساسي جمهوري اسلامي ايران بروشني ارجحيت هاي سياست خارجي ايران را روشن ساخته است. چهار گروه از كشورها به ترتيب داراي اولويت مي باشند:

1-همسايگان ايران

2-كشورهاي مسلمان

3-كشورهاي جهان سوم و

4-كشورهايي كه به نوعي يكي از نيازهاي سياسي ، اقتصادي،اجتماعي و يا نظامي ايران را برطرف سازند.

اگر نگاهي به موقعيت جغرافيايي ايران بيفكنيم، متوجه خواهيم شد كه ايران واسطه اي مابين دو منطقه مشحون از انرژي در جهان يعني خليج فارس و درياي خزر است. در محيط پس از جنگ سرد، ايران بصورت يك قدرت منطقه اي در آسياي جنوب غربي پديدار گشت و در حاليكه از لحاظ ژئو استراتژيك اهميت خود را افزايش داد، در دو منطقه بزرگتر يعني خاورميانه و آسياي مركزي و قفقاز نفوذ خود را افزود. در هر منطقه، سياستهاي ايران مشخص كننده نيازهاي اقتصادي و امنيتي ايران بود. و به همين دليل سياستهاي ايران گاه در بخش دوجانبه با كشورهاي مناطق موصوف با سياست هاي چند جانبه ايران در همان مناطق همپوشاني داشت. در جنوب روابط جديد ايران با عربستان سعودي، قطر و اخيرا امارات عربي متحده نشان از نگرش جديد سياست خارجي ايران به كشورهاي مزبور دارد. در آسياي مركزي، ايران بصورت كلي مايل به انكشاف روابط از طريق سياست هاي چند جانبه است. مورد مشخص آن تشويق كشورهاي اين منطقه به پيوستن به سازمان همكاري هاي اقتصادي (اكو) است. در همين زمينه مي توان گفت كه در حاليكه محرك ايران براي همكاري هاي خود با كشورهاي آسياي مركزي و قفقاز همچنان اقتصادي است[11]، در جنوب، دليل اصلي همكاري هاي ايران در خليج فارس، محرك هاي امنيتي ناشي از حضور سربازان آمريكايي در منطقه و عراق مي باشد.

 

4-سياست خارجي ايران و قدرت ملي

موقعيت ايران در ارتباط با عوامل زير همگي نشان از قدرت و موقعيت خاص اين كشور مي دهد.

-ايدئولوژي: اسلام بعنوان عقيده كامل و جامع حاكم بر انديشه و كاركرد نظام جمهوري اسلامي، شبكه ارزشي نظام را شكل مي دهد. مشروعيت نظام از دين حنيف سرچشمه گرفته و اقتدار حكومت كه خمير مايه ارتباط قدرت و سيستم ارزشي است از اسلام نشات مي گيرد[12]. توسعه و گسترش مشاركت واقعي مردم، تقويت روحيه ملي، يكپارچگي مابين ملت ايران با وجود تفاوت هاي فرهنگي، نژادي و قومي از پيامدهاي وجود يك مكتب فكري جامع در حكومت است.

-عوامل جغرافيايي: ايران بلحاظ وسعت، شكل، مرزها، و وضعيت اقليمي كشوري منحصر بفرد است. اين كشور با 15 همسايه مرز آبي و خاكي داشته و پل ارتباطي بين چهار منطقه شرق مديــــترانه، خليج فارس، آسياي مركزي و قفقاز، و شبه قاره هند ميباشد.

-عوامل اجتماعي-انساني: از جمله اين عوامل ميزان جمعيت است كه با داشتن 65 ميليون نفر با نرخ رشد مناسب از بزرگترين كشورهاي غرب آسيا و خاورميانه مي باشد. ديگر عامل ويژگيهاي ملي و روحيه مردم است. طرز تفكر، خلق و خوي و طرز عمل ايرانيان همواره از برتري كيفي نسبت به ديگر مردمان خبر داده است. روحيه مردم ايران در دشمن ستيزي و حفظ منافع ملي ايران باعث گرديد كه ايران از جنگ با عراق سربلند بيرون آيد.

-عوامل سياسي: ساختار حكومتي، شيوه هاي تصميم گيري و سياستگذاري در كشور بگونه ايست كه مي توان از آنها بعنوان منابع قدرت ياد كرد. نقش رهبري در مديريت ديپلماسي و ارائه اهداف و خط مشي هاي اقتصادي، فرهنگي، نظامي و اجتماعي پوشيده نيست. دولت جمهوري اسلامي ايران داراي ساختار نسبتا كارآمد و مناسب براي جهت گيري و اعمال سياست خارجي منسجم است. وجود مراكز و نهادهايي مانند رهبري، رياست جمهوري، شوراي عالي امنيت ملي، مجلس شوراي اسلامي و وزارت امور خارجه به كشور اين امكان را داده است كه خط مشي سياست خارجي خود را با عنايت به رسالت انقلاب اسلامي، اصول و اهداف نظام، بگونه اي انتخاب نمايد كه با توجه به توانائي هاي كشور، حداكثر شانس موفقيت را داشته باشد. اعتبار بين المللي كشور نيز بگونه ايست كه مي توان گفت با معيارهاي كنوني جهاني يعني توسعه صنعتي، پيشرفت علمي، بالا بودن سطح زندگي و رعايت موازين اخلاق اجتماعي، كشور در سطح مناسبي قرار دارد.

-عوامل اقتصادي: امكانات اقتصادي هر كشور از معيارهاي عمده قدرت ملي بشمار مي رود. نگاهي به شاخص هاي اقتصادي همچون توليد ناخالص ملي، درآمد ســـرانه، كميت و كيفيت توليدات صــنعتي و كشاورزي و دسـترسي به منابع نشان مي دهند كه همه عوامل براي ساختن ايراني آباد، پيشرفته و قوي فراهم است.

-عوامل نظامي: آنچه كه به عناصر جغرافيايي، منابع طبيعي و قابليت صنعتي اهميت واقعي مي بخشد، آمادگي نظامي است. قدرت ملي هر كشور بستگي مستقيم با وضعيت، توان و آمادگي نيروهاي مسلح دارد. جمهوري اسلامي ايران با در اختيار داشتن نيروهاي مسلح قوي و همچنين حمايت مردمي در قالب تشكل بسيج به نوعي سازماندهي شده است كه دشمنان نتوانند چشم طمع به خاك ايران داشته باشند[13]. همچنين ايران از لحاظ سه عامل مهم در بخش نظامي يعني برخورداري از نيروي نظامي نيرومند و بزرگ، برخورداري از تاسيسات، صنايع و تكنولوژي پيشرفته نظامي و برخورداري از روحيه قوي و تجربه كافي و انگيزه براي جنگيدن از موقعيت مناسبي برخوردار است[14].

 

5-اهداف سياست خارجي جمهوري اسلامي ايران

مهمترين منبع و ماخذ براي شناخت اهداف سياست خارجي ايران، قانون اساسي جمهوري اسلامي ايران مي باشد كه با توجه به آنچه كه در مقدمه و اصول آن آمده است، مي توان اهداف نظام و نهادهاي فرهنگي، اجتماعي، سياسي و اقتصادي ايران را كه بر اساس اصول و ضوابط اسلامي تدوين شده است بشناسيم. مجموعه اصول حاكم بر سياست خارجي را مي توان در زير سه عنوان كلي تقسيم نمود: عنوان اول، "تفوق حاكميت ملي" در اعمال سياست خارجي است. دوم، "ائتلاف و همزيستي بين المللي" است كه به موضوع برقراري روابط و همكاري كشورها با يكديگر و راه كارهاي ائتلاف و همبستگي جهاني اشاره دارد. و عنوان سوم نيز به "حمايت هاي انسان دوستانه" در سطح بين المللي است كه ايران بعنوان يكي از اعضاي جامعه جهاني متعهد به اعمال چنين سياست هايي است[15].

مجموع اهداف سياست خارجي ايران با بررسي قانون اساسي موارد زير است:

-سعادت انسان در كل جامعه بشري[16]

-استقلال كشور[17]

-ظلم ستيزي و عدالت خواهي و طرد نظام سلطه در جهان و حمايت از مبارزه حق

  طلبانه مستضعفين[18]

-تعهد برادرانه نسبت به همه مسلمانان[19]، ائتلاف و اتحاد ملل مسلمان و وحدت

  جهان اسلام[20] و نيز دفاع از حقوق مسلمانان جهان[21]

-نفي هرگونه ستم گري و ستم كشي[22] و نفي هرگونه سلطه گري و سلطه

  پذيري[23] و عدم تعهد در برابر قدرتهاي سلطه گر[24]

-طرد كامل استعمار[25] و جلوگيري از نفوذ اجانب[26] و حفظ تماميت ارضي[27] و نيز

   نفي و اجتناب از پيمانهايي كه موجب سلطه بيگانه بر منابع طبيعي و اقتصاد

   كشور[28]، فرهنگ و ارتش گردد[29].

-روابط صلح آميز متقابل با دول غير محارب

-صداقت و وفاي به عهد در معاهده ها[30].

 

6-ساختار تصميم گيري در سياست خارجي جمهوري اسلامي ايران

در جمهوري اسلامي ايران گروه هاي سياسي، اجتماعي، مذهبي و اقتصادي وجود دارند كه در اعمال سياستهاي متخذه ارگانهاي رسمي ذي نفوذ بوده و عكس العمل نشان ميدهند. از جمله مي توان از بيوت آيات عظام، ائمه جمعه، احزاب سياسي،  جامعه روحانيت مبارز، مجمع روحانيون مبارز، جامعه مدرسين حوزه علميه قم، نهادهاي انقلابي، رسانه ها و بويژه مطبوعات را نام برد. اما تصميم گيري در سياست خارجي داراي سلسله مراتب و نظام معيني است. بر طبق اصل 57 قانون اساسي، جمهوري اسلامي داراي سيستم حكومتي بر پايه تفكيك قواست. تدوين سياست خارجي در ايران و اجراي آن عمدتا در حوزه اختيارات رهبري، قوه مقننه و قوه مجريه است كه هركدام داراي اختيارات محدود در اين زمينه مي باشند.

-مقام رهبري: بخش مهمي از تصميمات سياست خارجي بطور مستقيم و يا غير مستقيم بر عهده رهبري مي باشد. مطابق اصل 110 قانون اساسي، تعيين سياست هاي كلي نظام، اختيار اعلام جنگ و صلح با رهبري است. از طرف ديگر، كليه مصوبات شوراي عالي امنيت ملي كه بخش مهـــمي از آنها در ارتبــاط با سياست خارجي است، مي بايد به تائيد رهبري رسيده و رهبر داراي اختيار براي نصب دو نفر در شوراي مزبور را دارد.

-رياست جمهوري: رئيس جمهور بر اساس اصل 113 قانون اساسي، مسئوليت اجراي قانون و تنظيم روابط قواي سه گانه و رياست قوه مجريه را بر عهده دارد. در ساختار تصميم گيري در سياست خارجي، رئيس جمهور با تعيين و معرفي وزير امور خارجه، با انتخاب سفرا و نمايندگان جمهوري اسلامي ايران و پذيرش سفراي خارجي مقيم تهران، در امضاي عهد نامه ها، مقاوله نامه ها، موافقت نامه ها و قراردادهاي دولت ايران با ساير دول و همچنين امضاي پيمانهاي مربوط به اتحاديه هاي بين المللي ذي مدخل است.

-هيات دولت: سياست كلي حاكم بر نظام جمهوري اسلامي بصورت مصوبات و با دستور العملهاي رهبري از طريق هيات وزيران و با توجه به مسئوليت هاي هريك از وزارتخانه ها به مرحله اجرا در مي آيد. در ابتداي هر سال دولت برنامه سالانه خود را به مجلس ارائه داده و مجلس با تصويب برنامه و اختصاص بودجه نقش مهمي در اجراي سياست خارجي دارد. برقراري و يا قطع روابط ديپلماتيك و همچنين كاهش و گسترش روابط با كشورهاي ديگر نيز از جمله اختيارات قوه مجريه است.

-مجلس شوراي اسلامي: عالي ترين نهاد قانونگذاري كشور بوده و در عموم مسائل، در حدود مقرر در قانون اساسي و با رعايت موازين شرع و اصول قانون اساسي مي تواند وضع قانون نمايد. مجلس شوراي اسلامي از طريق تصويب كليه عهد نامه ها، مقاوله نامه ها و موافقت نامه هاي بين المللي در سياست خارجي دخالت مي نمايد. همچنين هرگونه تغيير جزئي در خطوط مرزي، ارجاع به داوري، دريافت و يا اعطاي وام و استخدام كارشناسان خارجي به عهده مجلس شوراي اسلامي است.

-شوراي عالي امنيت ملي: اصل 176 قانون اساسي، وظائف شوراي عالي امنيت ملي به رياست رئيس جمهور را تعيين سياستهاي دفاعي-امنيتي كشور، هماهنگ نمودن فعاليتهاي سياسي، اطلاعاتي، اجتماعي، فرهنگي و اقتصادي و بهره گيري از امكانات مادي و معنوي كشور براي مقـــابله با تهديدهاي داخلي و خارجي مي داند. بخش عمده اي از وظائف شوراي عالي امنيت ملي در محدوده روابط خارجي كشور مي باشد.

-شوراي نگهبان: اين شورا نيز با اختياراتي كه اصول 94 و 96 قانون اساسي در تائيد نهايي مصوبات مجلس شوراي اسلامي به آن داده، مسئوليت تطبيق قوانين مصوبه مجلس را با قانون اساسي و شرع دارد و مي تواند در كنترل سياست خارجي نقش ايفا نمايد[31].

-مجمع تشخيص مصلحت نظام: اين مجمع گرچه بعنوان بازوي مشورتي رهبري شناخته شده است، اما در تدوين سياستهاي كلي نظام و همچنين اظهار نظر در مواردي كه اختلاف نظر مابين مجلس و شوراي نگهبان رفع نمي شود، اهميت دارد[32].

-قوه قضائيه: هرچند كه قوه قضائيه مستقيما در تصميم گيري در سياست خارجي ايران دخيل نيست، اما در دو بخش حضور اين قوه پررنگ مي شود. اول موارد مربوط به تحولات قضايي كشور و الزام وزارت امور خارجه به پاسخگويي در برابر نهادهاي حقوق بشري مانند كميسيون حقوق بشر سازمان ملل متحد و يا كميته حقوق بشر مستقر در ژنو است. دوم قوه قضائيه با داشتن دو بازوي نظارتي يعني ديوان عدالت اداري و سازمان بازرسي كل كشور بر فعاليت هاي وزارت امور خارجه نظارت مي نمايد[33].

-وزارت امور خارجه: گرچه مطابق قانون اساسي و قانون شرح وظايف وزارت امور خارجه مصوب 20 فروردين 1364، وزارت امور خارجه عهده دار اجراي سياست خارجي است[34]، ليكن نقش اين وزارتخانه به دو دليل از صرف اجرا بالاتر مي رود. اول آنكه در اكثر مراجع تصميم گير همچون شوراي عالي امنيت ملي و هيات دولت، وزير امور خارجه عضويت داشته و در مراجع ديگر مانند مجلس شوراي اسلامي و يا مجمع تشخيص مصلحت موضوع با حضور نماينده اي از وزارت خارجه بحث و بررسي مي گردد. دوم آنكه در برخي از اوقات حادثه پيش آمده بقدري سريع و غير مترقبه است كه نمايندگيها و مركز وزارت خارجه نمي توانند منتظر گردش كار در فضاي بوروكراتيك تصميم گيري سياست خارجي گردند. در اين گونه اوقات، وزير امور خارجه راسا تصميم گرفته وسپس مراتب را به مقامات ديگر گزارش مي دهد. از اين گذشته، آنچه كه در حوزه مسئوليت وزارت امور خارجه قرار دارد، امر كنترل، نظارت، ايجاد ارتباط و تامين نمايندگيها و همچنين تهيه و جمع آوري اطلاعات براي تصميم گيرندگان و مجريان سياست خارجي مي باشد. در اين ارتباط وظائف وزارت خارجه عباتست از:

الف: توجه و مراقبت دائم در باره وقايع بين المللي و اوضاع داخلي كشورها و تهيه گزارش

ب: بررسي، برقراري، حفظ و توسعه روابط خارجي دولت ايران با ساير دول و سازمانهاي بين المللي

ج:انجام مذاكره ومكاتبات با دول خارجي و سازمانهاي بين المللي

د:اداره ماموريت هاي سياسي و كنسولي وزارت امور خارجه و نظارت بر نمايندگي هاي دولت در خارج از كشور

ه: انجام و تامين ارتباط بين ارگانهاي مختلف دولت با دول خارجي[35].

 

7-اجراي سياست خارجي

پس از اتخاذ تصميم، سياستگذاران بايد آن را به اجراء گذارند. اجراي سياست خارجي تفاوت بسياري با اجراي سياست داخلي دارد. در سياست داخلي، دولت توسط حاكميت و كنترلي كه بر اتباع خود دارد، اجراي تصميمات را تضمين مي كند. ليكن در سياست خارجي، هيچ دولتي بر دولت ديگر كنترل حاكمانه ندارد. نخستين مرحله براي اجراي سياست خارجي، توضيح قانع كننده مي باشد. كشورهايي كه همكاري آنها براي اجراي تصميمات ضروري است، بايد قانع شوند كه سياست اتخاذ شده به نفع آنها نيز هست. پس از بيان محتواي سياست خارجي براي بازيگران ذيربط و يا رقيب، چانه زدن براي حصول نقطه نظر مشترك آغاز مي شود[36]. در حالي كه چانه زني ادامه دارد، بازيگري كه خواهان اجراي سياست معيني است، مي تواند از ابزارهايي براي وارد كردن ديگران بهره گيرد. ابزارها و تكنيك هاي اجراي سياست خارجي عبارتند از:

-ابزار هاي سياسي، كه عمدتا از تلاشهاي پرسنل ماهر تشكيل شده است. اينان ميتوانند در كشور هدف بگونه اي عمل كنند كه فرآيند سياسي آن را در جهت منافع كشور خويش هدايت كنند.

-ابزارهاي ديپلماتيك، كه از افراد با مهارتي كه نماينده حكومت خود در كشورهاي ذيربط هستند، تشكيل شده است. وظيفه آنان مذاكره و چانه زني با كشورهاي هدف به منظور دستيابي به توافق بر سر منافع ملي است.

-ابزارهاي اطلاع رساني و ارتباطات كه وظيفه آنها برقراري ارتباط با افكار عمومي و رسانه هاي جمعي كشورهاي هدف است.

-ابزارهاي اقتصادي كه عمدتا در دست كشورهاي غني تر و پيشرفته تر است، يكي از معمولترين و كارآمدترين ابزارهاي اجرايي سياست خارجي است. هرچه كشور هدف، از لحاظ اقتصادي به كشور صاحب تصميم وابسته تر باشد، ابزارهاي اقتصادي تعيين كننده تر خواهند بود.

-ابزارهاي نظامي، كه بوسيله آن عليه كشور هدف، زور اعمال مي شود تا به منافع صاحبان سياست گردن گذارد. معمولا ابزار نظامي پس از بي كفايتي و عدم كارآيي ساير ابزارها مورد بهره برداري قرار مي گيرد[37].

 

8-پروسه تصميم گيري در سياست خارجي ايران

سياست خارجي جمهوري اسلامي ايران نتيجه تعامل پيچيده و چند سطحي مابين بازيگران حكومتي و غير دولتي است. اين بازيگران هركدام اهداف متفاوت و بعضا متضاد را پي گيري مي نمايند. اما بهرحال تاكنون پروسه تصميم گيري در سياست خارجي ايران و خطوط كلي سياست خارجي بقدر كافي روشن و شفاف بوده است.

بصورت كلي دو ديدگاه راجع به سياست خارجي ايران و جود دارد كه ريشه در ديدگاه اين دو گروه نسبت به حكومت ايران و آنهم خود به اساس نگرش به حكومت از ديدگاه اسلامي و يا ايراني دارد. هويت اسلامي و هويت ايراني حاكميت در ديدگاه اين دو دسته از يكديگر مجزاست.

 گروه اول هويت اصلي جمهوري اسلامي ايران را برخاسته از انقلاب اسلامي با هدف بازگشت به ارزشهاي اسلامي مي دانند. در آستانه انقلاب اسلامي در ايران، لايه هاي اجتماعي جامعه ايراني عليرغم نارضايتي وسيع مابين آنان، اما در زير فشار فقر، سوء تغذيه، ناامني و يا تنازعات قومي و نژادي نبودند. مردم براي آن به خيابانها ريختند كه احساس مي نمودند كه فرهنگ اسلامي توسط دولت ايران ناديده گرفته شده، سنت هاي جامعه ايراني به فراموشي سپرده شده و بي عدالتي در روابط بين المللي توسط حكومت ايران و بخصوص شاه، همكار آمريكا در منطقه  تشديد مي گردد. اين دسته براي بقاي نظام جمهوري اسلامي پيشنهاد مي نمايند كه:

1-حفظ توده هاي مسلمان در كشورهاي اسلامي بعنوان متحدين ايماني

2-ايجاد روابط نزديك با كشورهاي اسلامي

3-اجتناب از مذاكره با آمريكا بعنوان ابرقدرت مسئول تحقير امت اسلامي.

گروه دوم بر اين باورند كه ايران يك ملت-دولت مانند ديگر واحد هاي سياسي در جهان امروزي است و بايد در صحنه بين المللي يك بازيگر عمده باشد. ژئوپليتيك و موقعيت اقتصادي و انرژي ايران نيز بر اهميت ايران تاكيد مي نمايد. آنان عقيده دارند كه تجارت بين المللي و ايجاد روابط سياسي مهمترين ابزار در جهان معاصر براي حفظ منافع ملي ايران است.

 

9-چند نتيجه:

اين مقاله در پي آن بود كه نشان دهد كه چگونه جمهوري اسلامي ايران ابعاد متنوع يك حكومت اسلامي را با دمكراسي پارلماني در آميخته است. بسياري از محققان بر دوگانه بودن نظام جمهوري اسلامي ايران پاي فشرده اند، اما بنظر مي رسد كه در طراحي و تصميم سازي سياست خارجي، نوعي اجماع در ميان تصميم سازان وجود دارد. خصوصا زماني كه تهديدي متوجه كشور است، تصميمات حكومت در مورد سياست خارجي بيشتر به سمت حفظ منافع ملي ميل مي نمايد.

-از ديدگاه نقادانه اگر به فرآيند تصميم گيري در سياست خارجي جمهوري اسلامي نگاه افكنيم، متوجه خواهيم شد كه اين فرآيند نسبتا طولاني است و در مواقع بحراني كه كمبود زمان از مشخصات اصلي آن است، اين پروسه ناكارآمد خواهد بود.

-سازگاري و يا عدم سازگاري اهداف سياست خارجي با فضاي حاكم بر صحنه محيط بين المللي ضرورتا از اهداف تعارضي ناشي نمي شود. گاه ممكن است كه ديپلماسي ضعيف، محافظه كار و بدبينانه تصميم گيران و يا مجريان موجب شود تا بسياري از اهداف همگون و حتي غير متعارض بازيگران در صحنه محيطي به اجرا درنيايد.

-چون محيط عملياتي و اجرايي سياست خارجي فراتر از محيطي است كه در آن تصميم اتخاذ مي شود، طبيعي است كه درصدي از اهـداف سياست خارجي در صحنه عملياتي بين المللي عقيم و انجام نشده باقي بماند.

 

---

[1]  براي مطالعه اهميت ايران در جهان معاصر بنگريد:

-فولر، گراهام،  ايران: قبله عالم، ترجمه عباس مخبر، تهران: نشر مركز، 1373.

-Ramazani, R. K.;  Revolutinary Iran: Challenges and Response in the Middle East; London: John Hopkins University Press, 1988.

-Souresrafil, Omid; The Islamic Success: The Untold Story of the Islamic Revolution of Iran; Australia: Fast Books, 1996.

·                     [2] Maleki, Abbas; "Who determines the Iran's Boundaries in the Caspian Sea", delivered in "Symposium on Modern Boundaries of Iran: The Problems and Practices of Iranian Boundaries"; School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London;  London, October 9 & 10, 2002.  

[3] Maleki, Abbas; "Iran and Persian Gulf”, delivered in Gulf Security Conference 2001, by The Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, London. September 13-14, 2001.

[4] Ehteshami, Anoushirvan, "The Foreign Policy of Iran"; in Hinnebucsh, Raymond & Anoushirvan Ehteshami (eds); The Foreign Policies of Middle East States; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub. 2002. Pp. 311-34.

[5] در 25 اسفند ماه 1381، آيت الله خامنه اي، رهبر انقلاب، اعضاي مجمع تشخيص مصلحت نظام در دوره جديد را منصوب نمودند.

[6] http://www.irna.com/en/head/020316230512.ehe.shtml

[7] Nation-States

[8] ولايتي، علي اكبر، "سخن نخست"، مجله سياست خارجي، شماره 1، 1365، ص. 3، ص. 408.

[9] ملكي، عباس، "ايده آليسم و رئاليسم"، مجله سياست خارجي، شماره 3، تابستان 1366،

[10] Roshandel, Jalil; "Iran's Foreign and Security Policies: How the Decision Making Process Evolved"; Security Dialogue; London: Sage Publications, 31 (1), March 2000, P. 219.

[11] Kaveh, L. Afrasiabi; After Khomeini; New York; West View Press, 1994, Pp. 34-36.

[12] هاشمي، محمد، "ابعاد حقوقي سياست خارجي ايران"، بولتن مركز مطالعات عالي بين المللي، سال دوم، شماره پنجم، شهريور 1381، صص. 10-15.

[13]ملكي، عباس، "سياست خارجي ايران"، مجله ايتاليايي ماركوپولو، ناپل: انستيتو روابط بين الملل ايتاليا، 1997، صص21-25.   

[14] محمدي، منوچهر، انقلاب اسلامي در مقايسه با انقلاب هاي فرانسه و روسيه، تهران: مولف، 1374، ص. 82.

[15] هاشمي، محمد، "ابعاد حقوقي سياست خارجي ايران"، بولتن مركز مطالعات عالي بين المللي، سال دوم، شماره پنجم، شهريور 1381، ص. 12.

[16] قانون اساسي جمهوري اسلامي ايران، اصل 152

[17] اصل 2 بند ج

[18] اصل 2

[19] اصل3

[20] اصل 3

[21] اصل 152

[22] اصل 2 بند ج

[23] اصل 2 بند ج

[24] اصل 152

[25] اصل 3 بند 5

[26] اصل 3 بند 5

[27] اصل 3 بند 11

[28] اصل 43 بند8

[29] اصل 153

[30] متولي، ذكريا، چگونگي افزايش كارآيي سياست خارجي، تهران: پايان نامه در دانشكده روابط بين الملل وزارت امور خارجه، صص116-120

[31] ايزدي، بيژن، سياست خارجي جمهوري اسلامي ايران، تهران: مركز انتشارات حوزه علميه قم، 1371، صص. 107-130.

[32] ملكي، عباس، "فرآيند تصميم گيري در سياست خارجي ايران"، فصلنامه راهبرد، شماره 27، بهار 1382، ص. 104

[33] نيرآبادي، حميد، ساختار رسمي تصميم گيري در سياست خارجي جمهوري اسلامي ايران، تهران: دانشكده روابط بين الملل وزارت امور خارجه، 1375، ص. 174.

[34] وزارت امور خارجه، سياستگذاران و رجال سياسي در روابط خارجي ايران، تهران: دفتر مطالعات سياسي و بين المللي، 1369، ص. 153.

[35] محمدي، منوچهر، سياست خارجي جمهوري اسلامي ايران: اصول و مسائل، تهران، نشر دادگستر، 1377، صص. 95-98.

[36] مقتدر، هوشنگ، مباحثي در باره سياست بين المللي و سياست خارجي، تهران: دانشكده علوم سياسي و اجتماعي، 1358، صص. 173-177.

[37]خوشوقت، محمد حسين، تجزيه و تحليل تصميم گيري در سياست خارجي، تهران: موسسه چاپ و انتشارات وزارت امور خارجه، 1375، صص. 266-268.   

Foreign Policy: Iran

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An Anti-Democracy Foreign Policy: Iran
by Jacob G. Hornberger, January 31, 2005

When Iranians took U.S. officials hostage in the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979, Americans were mystified and angry, not being able to comprehend how Iranians could be so hateful toward U.S. officials, especially since the U.S. government had been so supportive of the shah of Iran for some 25 years. What the American people failed to realize is that the deep anger and hatred that the Iranian people had in 1979 against the U.S. government was rooted in a horrible, anti-democratic act that the U.S. government committed in 1953. That was the year the CIA secretly and surreptitiously ousted the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, a man named Mohammad Mossadegh, from power, followed by the U.S. government’s ardent support of the shah of Iran’s dictatorship for the next 25 years.

Today, very few Americans have ever heard of Mohammad Mossadegh, but that wasn’t the case in 1953. At that time, Mossadegh was one of the most famous figures in the world. Here’s the way veteran New York Times correspondent Stephen Kinzer decribes him in his book All the Shah’s Men:

In his time, Mohammad Mossadegh was a titanic figure. He shook an empire and changed the world. People everywhere knew his name. World leaders sought to influence him and later to depose him. No one was surprised when Time magazine chose him over Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and Winston Churchill as its Man of the Year for 1951.

(Kinzer’s book, published in 2003, is an excellent account of the CIA coup; much of this article is based on his book.)

There were two major problems with Mossadegh, however, as far as both the British and American governments were concerned. First, as an ardent nationalist he was a driving force behind an Iranian attempt to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British company that had held a monopoly on the production and sale of Iranian oil since the early part of the 20th century. Second, fiercely independent, Mossadegh refused to do the bidding of the U.S. government, which by this time had become fearful that Mossadegh might align Iran with America’s World War II ally and post–World War II enemy, the Soviet Union.

As Kinzer puts it,

Historic as Mossadegh’s rise to power was for Iranians, it was at least as stunning for the British. They were used to manipulating Iranian prime ministers like chess pieces, and now, suddenly, they faced one who seemed to hate them....

[U.S. presidential envoy Averell] Harriman paid a call on the Shah before leaving Tehran, and during their meeting he made a discreet suggestion. Since Mossadegh was making it impossible to resolve the [Anglo-American Oil Company] crisis on a basis acceptable to the West, he said, Mossadegh might have to be removed. Harriman knew the Shah had no way of removing Mossadegh at that moment. By bringing up the subject, however, he foreshadowed American involvement in the coup two years later.

The 1953 CIA coup in Iran was named “Operation Ajax” and was engineered by a CIA agent named Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. Capitalizing on the oil-nationalization showdown between Iran and Great Britain, which had thrown Iran into chaos and crisis, Kermit Roosevelt skillfully used a combination of bribery of Iranian military officials and CIA-engendered street protests to pull off the coup.

The first stage of the coup, however, was unsuccessful, and the shah, who had partnered with the CIA to oust Mossadegh from office, fled Tehran in fear of his life. However, in the second stage of the coup a few days later, the CIA achieved its goal, enabling the shah to return to Iran in triumph ... and with a subsequent 25-year, U.S.-supported dictatorship, which included one of the world’s most terrifying and torturous secret police, the Savak.

For years, the U.S. government, including the CIA, kept what it had done in Iran secret from the American people and the world, although the Iranian people long suspected CIA involvement. U.S. officials, not surprisingly, considered the operation one of their greatest foreign-policy successes ... until, that is, the enormous convulsion that rocked Iranian society with the violent ouster of the shah and the installation of a virulently anti-American Islamic regime in 1979.

It is impossible to overstate the magnitude of anger and hatred that the Iranian people had for the U.S. government in 1979, not only because their world-famous democratically elected prime minister had been ousted by the CIA but also for having had to live for the following 25 years under a brutal and torturous dictatorship, a U.S.-government-supported dictatorship that also offended many Iranians with its policies of Westernization. In fact, the reason that the Iranian students took control of the U.S. embassy after the violent ouster of the shah in 1979 was their genuine fear that the U.S. government would repeat what it had done in 1953.

Imagine, for example, that it turned out that a foreign regime had secretly and surreptitiously ousted President Kennedy from office because of his refusal to do the bidding of that foreign regime. What would have been the response of the American people toward that government?

Indeed, imagine that the CIA had ousted Kennedy to protect our “national security,” given what some in the CIA believed to be Kennedy’s “soft-on-communism” mind-set, evidenced, for example, by his refusal to provide air support at the Bay of Pigs, which resulted in the CIA’s failure to oust communist Fidel Castro from power in Cuba. What would have been the response of the American people to that?

At the time of the CIA coup, Iran was in fact in crisis and chaos. But democracy is oftentimes messy and unpredictable, and it no more guarantees freedom and economic stability than authoritarianism or totalitarianism does. (Think about the crisis and economic instability during America’s Great Depression along with Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies.) All democracy does is provide people with the means to bring about a peaceful transition of power. By violently injecting itself into Iran’s democratic process through its removal of their democratically elected prime minister, the U.S. government guaranteed the omnipotent dictatorship of the (unelected) shah, a dictatorship that would continue for the next 25 years, with the full support of the U.S. government. It was a convulsive event whose consequences continue to shake America and the world today.

As historian James Bill stated (quoted in Kinzer’s book),

[The coup] paved the way for the incubation of extremism, both of the left and of the right. This extremism became unalterably anti-American.... The fall of Mossadegh marked the end of a century of friendship between the two countries, and began a new era of U.S. intervention and growing hostility against the United States among the weakened forces of Iranian nationalism.

Kinzer writes,

The coup brought the United States and the West a reliable Iran for twenty-five years. That was an undoubted triumph. But in view of what came later, and of the culture of covert action that seized hold of the American body politic in the coup’s wake, the triumph seems much tarnished. From the seething streets of Tehran and other Islamic capitals to the scenes of terror attacks around the world, Operation Ajax has left a haunting and terrible legacy.

Mohammad Mossadegh died in 1967 at the age of 82, having been under house arrest in his hometown of Ahmad Abad since the time of the 1953 CIA coup that ousted him from power. The shah of Iran, who would remain in power until the Iranian Revolution of 1979, would not permit any public funeral or other expression of mourning for Mossadegh.

In a speech delivered in March 2000 by Madeleine Albright (then secretary of state ), the U.S. government finally acknowledged what it had done to the Iranian people and to democracy in Iraq:

In 1953, the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran’s popular prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons, but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development and it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs. Moreover, during the next quarter century, the United States and the West gave sustained backing to the Shah’s regime. Although it did much to develop the country economically, the Shah’s government also brutally repressed political dissent. As President Clinton has said, the United States must bear its fair share of responsibility for the problems that have arisen in U.S.-Iranian relations.

Not surprisingly, Albright’s “apology” fell on many deaf ears in Iran. While Iranians certainly have not forgotten the U.S. government’s support of Saddam Hussein and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s, including its furnishing Saddam with weapons of mass destruction to use against the Iranian people, the root of Iranian anger lies with the anti-democracy foreign policy of the U.S. government, by which U.S. officials ousted the Iranian people’s democratically elected prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, from office in 1953.

Mr. Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation. Send him email.

Foreign relations of Iran

Foreign relations of Iran

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For current international events related to Iran see Current international disputes with Iran

 

Contents

[hide]

·                                 1 Introduction

·                                 2 History

o                                                        2.1 Post Revolution Period (1979-1980)

o                                                        2.2 Iran-Iraq War Period (1980-1988)

o                                                        2.3 Post War Period (1988-present)

o                                                        2.4 Significant historical treaties

·                                 3 Current policies of The Islamic Republic of Iran

o                                                        3.1 Current disputes

o                                                        3.2 Combatting the flow of illicit drugs

o                                                        3.3 Relations with the United States of America and the Member States of the European Union

o                                                        3.4 Regional interference or influence?

·                                 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

·                                 5 References

·                                 6 See also

7 External links

[edit] Introduction

Darvazeh-e-Bagh-e-Melli: The main gates to Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran.

The newly renovated building of Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses pre-Islamic Persian architecture extensively in its facade.

Since the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini's regime initiated sharp changes from the foreign policy pursued by the Shah, particularly in reversing the country's orientation toward the West. Following Iran's initial post-revolutionary idealistic and hard-line foreign policy and the Iran-Iraq war, the country has begun to settle down into a more rational foreign policy. However, this is still occasionally overshadowed by rhetoric.

In recent years Iran has made great strides in improving relations with its neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia. Iran's regional goals are trying not to be dominated by wanting to establish a leadership role, curtail the presence of the United States and other outside powers, and build trade ties. In broad terms, Iran's foreign policy emphasizes three main guidelines:

·                                 It takes stances against the United States and Israel, the former as a military power that threatens it in the Persian Gulf, and the latter as part of its stance to support the Palestinians. See U.S.-Iran relations.

·                                 It wants to eliminate outside influence in the region. Iran sees itself as a regional power, when global powers such as the United States or the United Kingdom do not supersede it. It seeks to reduce their presence in the Persian Gulf wherever possible.

·                                 It pursues a great increase in diplomatic contacts with developing and non-aligned countries, as part of an effort to build trade and political support, now that it has lost its pre-revolutionary US backing.

Despite these guidelines, however, bilateral relations are frequently confused and contradictory, due to Iran's oscillation between pragmatic and ideological concerns.

[edit] History

[edit] Post Revolution Period (1979-1980)

The country's foreign relations since the revolution have been tumultuous. A number of varying factors account for this; the most important among them is Iran's significant anti-western backlash after its revolution (The roots of this were in the west's support for the Shah).

At this time, Iran found itself very isolated, due to its hardline and aggressive Islamic foreign policy, which wanted to see its revolutionary ideals spread across the Persian Gulf. This resulted in confrontation with the U.S. in the hostage crisis.

[edit] Iran-Iraq War Period (1980-1988)

Iranian attempts to spread its Islamic revolution also strained the country's relations with many of its Arab neighbors. In 1981, Iran supported a plot to overthrow the Bahraini government. In 1983, Iran expressed political support for Shi'ites who bombed Western embassies in Kuwait, and in 1987, Iranian pilgrims rioted at poor living conditions and treatment and were consequently massacred during the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Nations with strong fundamentalist movements, such as Egypt and Algeria, also began to mistrust Iran. With the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Iran was thought to be supporting the creation of the Hizballah organization. Furthermore, Iran went on to oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process, because it saw Israel as an illegal country.

Iran also concerned European nations, particularly France and Germany, after its secret service executed several radical Iranian dissidents in Europe.

Relations with Iraq had never been good historically; however, they took a turn for the worse in 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran. The stated reason for Iraq's invasion was centered around sovereignty over the waterway between the two countries, the Arvandrud (Shatt al-Arab). However, other non-stated reasons are probably more convincing. Iran and Iraq had a history of interference in each other's affairs by supporting separatist movements. Although these interferences had stopped since the Algiers Agreement (1975), Iran resumed support for Kurdish guerrillas in Iraq after the Revolution.

Iran demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian territory and the return to the status quo ante for the Arvandrud, as established under the 1975 Algiers Agreement signed by Iraq and Iran. This period saw Iran become even more isolated—with virtually no allies. Exhausted by the war, Iran signed UN Security Council Resolution 598 in July 1988 after the United States and Germany began supplying Iraq with chemical weapons. The cease-fire, resulting from the UN Resolution, was implemented on August 20, 1988. Neither nation had made any real gains in the war. It left one million dead (including about 700,000 Iranians) and had a dramatic effect on the country's foreign policy. From this point on, the until-then-radical Islamist government recognised that it had no choice but to moderate and rationalise its objectives. This was the beginning of what Anoushiravan Ehteshami calls the reorientation phase of Iranian foreign policy

[edit] Post War Period (1988-present)

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's new foreign policy (see Introduction) has had a dramatic effect on its global standing. Relations with the European Union have dramatically improved to the point where Iran is a major oil exporter and trading partner for countries such as Italy, France, and Germany. China and India have also emerged as friends of Iran. Together, these three countries face similar challenges in the global economy as they industrialize and consequently find themselves aligned on a number of issues.

Iran maintains regular diplomatic and commercial relations with Russia and the former Soviet Republics. Both Iran and Russia believe they have important national interests at stake in developments in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, particularly on energy resources from the Caspian Sea. Russian and other sales of military equipment and technology concern Iran's neighbors and the United States.

[edit] Significant historical treaties

·                                 Treaty of Zuhab

·                                 Turkmanchai treaty

·                                 Gulistan Treaty

·                                 Akhal Treaty

·                                 Paris Treaty of 1857 (by which Iran loses rights over Herat and parts of Afghanistan.)

·                                 Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907

[edit] Current policies of The Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran accords priority to its relations with the other states in the region and with the rest of the Islamic world. This includes a strong commitment to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement. Relations with the states of the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially with Saudi Arabia, have improved in recent years. However, an unresolved territorial dispute with the United Arab Emirates concerning three islands in the Persian Gulf (see above) continues to mar its relations with these states.

Tehran supports the interim Governing Council in Iraq, but it strongly advocates a prompt and full transfer of state authority to the Iraqi people. Iran hopes for stabilization in Afghanistan and supports the reconstruction effort so that the Afghan refugees in Iran (which number approximately 2.5 million) can return to their homeland and the flow of drugs from Afghanistan can be stemmed. Iran is also pursuing a policy of stabilization and cooperation with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, whereby it is seeking to capitalise on its central location to establish itself as the political and economic hub of the region.

[edit] Current disputes

·                                 Iran and Iraq restored diplomatic relations in 1990, but they are still trying to work out written agreements settling outstanding disputes from their eight-year war concerning border demarcation, prisoners-of-war, and freedom of navigation and sovereignty over the Arvand Rud waterway.

·                                 Iran governs and owns two islands in the Persian Gulf claimed by the UAE: Lesser Tunb (which the UAE calls Tunb as Sughra in Arabic, and Iran calls Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Kuchek in Persian) and Greater Tunb (which the UAE calls Tunb al Kubra in Arabic, and Iran calls Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Bozorg in Persian).

·                                 Iran jointly administers with the UAE an island in the Persian Gulf claimed by the UAE (Arabic, Abu Musa; Persian, Jazireh-ye Abu Musa), over which Iran has taken steps to exert unilateral control since 1992, including access restrictions.

·                                 The Caspian Sea borders are not yet determined with Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan, although this problem is set to be resolved peacefully in the coming years through slow negotiations. Issues between Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were settled in 2003, but Iran does not recognize these agreements, albeit it has no common border with Russia or Kazakhstan.

[edit] Combatting the flow of illicit drugs

Despite substantial interdiction efforts, Iran remains a key transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin (primarily from neighboring Afghanistan) to Europe; domestic consumption of narcotics remains a persistent problem and Iranian press reports estimate that there are at least 1.2 million drug users in the country. Iran has been trying to increase the profile of its anti-drugs campaign abroad, but it is having little success. Most countries support it politically, but refuse Iran the critical equipment and training it needs.

[edit] Relations with the United States of America and the Member States of the European Union

Main article: U.S.-Iran relations

Relations between Iran and the United States have been disrupted since the revolution in Iran. Iran does not maintain diplomatic relations with either the United States or Israel, and it views the Middle East peace process with skepticism. Relations between Iran on the one hand and the European Union and its member states on the other hand are slowly but surely increasing in importance, a fact underscored by President Seyed Mohammad Khatami's visits to Italy, France and Germany in July 2000 and to Austria and Greece in March 2002, as well as by reciprocal visits of European heads of state and government to Tehran and a lively exchange at ministerial levels. In 2002, the European Union launched negotiations on a Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) with Iran. Parallel to these negotiations, the EU voiced its expectation that the political dialogue with Iran must lead to concrete results in the areas of human rights, efforts to counter terrorism, Iran’s stance on the Middle East peace process and issues associated with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. During a joint visit to Tehran in October 2003, the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom successfully prompted the Iranian government to sign an additional protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and commit itself to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and voluntarily suspend its uranium enrichment and processing activities.

[edit] Regional interference or influence?

Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy sums up this question best:

"A strong sense of history pervades Iran. Many Iranians consider their natural sphere of influence to extend beyond Iran's present borders. After all, Iran was once much larger. Portuguese forces seized islands and ports in the 16th and 17th centuries. In the 19th century, the Russian Empire wrested from Tehran's control what is today Armenia, Republic of Azerbaijan, and part of Georgia. Iranian elementary school texts teach about the Iranian roots not only of cities like Baku, but also cities further north like Derbent in southern Russia. The Shah lost much of his claim to western Afghanistan following the Anglo-Iranian war of 1856-1857. Only in 1970 did a UN sponsored consultation end Iranian claims to suzerainty over the Persian Gulf island nation of Bahrain. In centuries past, Iranian rule once stretched westward into modern Iraq and beyond. When the western world complains of Iranian interference beyond its borders, the Iranian government often convinced itself that it is merely exerting its influence in lands that were once its own. Simultaneously, Iran's losses at the hands of outside powers have contributed to a sense of grievance that continues to the present day."^[1]

[edit] Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran is selected by the President of Iran. Manouchehr Mottaki is the current acting Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hamid Reza Assefi is the official spokesman.

[edit] References

1.                               ^ Patrick Clawson. Eternal Iran. Palgrave. 2005. Coauthored with Michael Rubin (historian). ISBN 1-4039-6276-6 p.9, 10

[edit] See also

 

 

سیاست خارجی ایران دیدگاهی از ایران

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY : THE VIEW FROM IRAN

Abbas Maleki

Almost seventeen years have elapsed since the victory of the Islamic Revolution. From the early days of the revolution, some countries, particularly some great powers, have either remained indifferent or taken a hostile posture towards the events in Iran. This is of course understandable. The Iranian Revolution was launched into the global scene with an insistence of Islamic values and the determination to reject superpower domination and intervention. Some great powers, on the other hand, were set upon "containing" Iran precisely because they were fearful of Iran's determination.

As has been the case in many post-revolutionary situations, anti-revolutionaries based abroad were supported by foreign powers ostensibly to enhance the democratic opening in Iran but, in fact, to restore their domination. The final coup de grace to the revolutionary forces was supposed to have been furnished by the Iraqi invasion of Iran which, as the world community well knows, imposed an eight-year war that only entailed human tragedy on a massive scale but also had severe destabilising consequences for region as a whole.

Iran, of course, withstood all these pressures and came of the war with a positive outlook towards the future. And this seems to be somewhat difficult for the power wielders of the world to absorb as they continue to distort the image of the Islamic Republic of Iran, pretending that there is nothing in Iran except violence, riots, restrictions and values incompatible with international environment. The "terrorist, rogue, backlash, pariah..." Iranian state (and at times nation) is represented lurking behind every dark corner of the globe pursuing aims that cannot even be sensibly defined as Iranian national interest. The distortions concerning life in Iran and the foreign policy objectives of the Iranian state are so overwhelming that a reiteration of some basic facts seems necessary at every step.

Clearly, the first point that needs to be elaborated upon, incredibly I might add, is the fact that a revolution has indeed occurred in Iran. Like any other revolution, the Iranian Revolution was a culmination of many forces, in this case coalescing to undermine a Western-oriented dictatorial regime. Let us not forget that the whole society rose to contest the shah's political hold over the society and in the process make a power claim that had ramifications beyond politics, extending into the body and soul of Iranian polity. To ignore, or more accurately reject, this Iranian yearning for more proper state-society relations is not only immoral but also politically dangerous, a point that cannot be overlooked by the current Iranian leadership. Gone are the days of one man decrees and, some would add nostalgically, the days when Iranians spoke in one voice. And, we are proud of it! Impartial observers all agree the Iranian struggle for more proper state-society relations has been a genuine one, certainly by Middle East standards, giving the foreign policy-making process a degree of complexity not seen in the past.

The second point relates to certain post-revolutionary achievements that even the most hostile opponents cannot ignore. The preservation of the territorial integrity of a country such as Iran, during the war and particularly in the post-cold war era, has not been an easy task. A glance at the surrounding environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, from Central Asia to the Middle East proper, attests to the multitude of problems relating to the legitimacy of government and ethnic conflicts. Iran, on the other hand, sits calmly in the midst of all this trouble, preserving its territorial integrity, enjoying security and allowing for easy ethnic interaction.

And yes! Iranian success in maintaining integrity in the post-revolutionary era should not be considered limited to territory. Islam is once again claimed both a religion and an identity for Iranians. No wonder, in the Islamic cultural arena, Iranians are once again making valuable and vibrant contribution to the global culture. Debates and discussions about the future of Islamic civilisation have become part of everyday life in newspapers, journals, books as well as political arenas such as the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis). The nature of the evolving political, social and economic system is continuously discussed and our relations with the global community closely scrutinised. To just give a few examples of the vitality of the Iranian Islamic culture, just witness the number of book titles in the post-revolutionary era (10,000 a year in comparison to 3,000 in the pre-Revolutionary period). Also to be noted is the Iranian film industry which is well-received both inside and outside of Iran.

Having laid out the above basics, we can now turn our attention to the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. If indeed the Islamic Republic of Iran is a complex and vibrant post-revolutionary society, what kind of foreign policy does she seek or what kind of foreign policy suits her best? And, given the dogmatic persistence of some countries to isolate Iran, or more properly, pressure her to mend her ways, how can Iran realise its foreign policy objectives? Indeed, what are Iran's foreign policy objectives?

IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

Iran's foreign policy objectives are obviously generated from her particular geostrategic and economic position. At the same time, it is important to reiterate that her specific post-revolutionary context makes her more determined to pursue political independence and reject being pigeonholed as a supplier of raw materials to the global economic system. As such, Iran's foreign policy objectives and aspirations can be summarised as follows: maintaining of our territorial integrity and security, safeguarding of our evolving political system, providing our people with basic welfare, and pursuing a foreign policy that acknowledges our Muslim identity as a nation and operates within the context of values generated by Islam.

The maintenance of territorial integrity and security is clearly an acknowledged right and duty of every nation-state. For us, it has also been a particularly immediate foreign policy objective as we have been forced to fight for our territorial integrity and security with blood as well as diplomatic manoeuvring in very recent years. What is important to be reiterated in this regard, however, is that Iran, unlike many of her neighbours, can easily be considered a territorially satisfied state with its diplomatic and military efforts directed at guarding well-established borders and maintaining status in a region in which territorial disputes constitute a norm.

The safeguarding of our evolving political system is also an important foreign policy objective for Iran. As mentioned earlier, this system emerged out of a truly revolution and was designed to embody Iranian concerns over political independence, proper state-society relations and Muslim identity . To be sure, many of our institutions such as the presidency, Islamic Consultative Assembly, city councils, etc. are young and this alone assures their evolving nature. Nevertheless, we have laid certain foundations that cannot and will not be compromised. The insistence on this as foreign policy objective may sound somewhat out of place. But we do so partly because it is the predicament of all post-revolutionary systems and partly because our system is faced with intense hostility from certain corners of the globe. Indeed, when foreign funds are publicly allocated to destabilise our political system we have no other choice but to drag concerns over the safeguarding of our system into foreign policy objectives.

Economic objectives constitute yet another dimension of our foreign policy. We clearly understand that our system cannot sustain itself unless it provides for the basic needs and welfare of our population. Favourable economic conditions contribute to national cohesion as well as political legitimacy. Since the revolution, we have adopted a combination of macro approaches to the economy, including nationalisation, government control and privatisation. We have had our ups and downs but in spite of economic pressures and inflation, the economic situation is not discouraging. Our foreign policy has actively sought to help pave the way for the realisation of economic objectives. Generally speaking, we have approached external economic relations with a freer hand, providing for a free flow of capital at the regional and international levels. We have never cut off our economic relations with the world and continue to insist upon them despite various sanctions against us. We know that our long-term security is very much dependent upon an integrated regional energy and economic policy and consider foreign policy as an active instrument in bringing about this regional outlook.

Finally, I must turn to the last of our foreign objectives which is perhaps the most difficult for some to understand. What does it mean to say that we insist on our Muslim identity as a foreign policy objective? It simply means that we are concerned about the plight of our Muslim brethren throughout the world and consider relations with them as a foreign policy priority. It does not mean that we are the source of all troubles throughout the Muslim world or seek an adventurist foreign policy. Yes! we are unhappy with certain aspects of the global system which marginalizes Muslims economically, crushes their voice politically, and literally murders them militarily. And we have expressed and continue to express our concerns through proper diplomatic and organisational channels as in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We also seek policies that draw upon Muslim commonalties to promote cultural and economic interaction within the Muslim world. Most importantly, we feel that Islam is the core value upon which cultural interaction can be realised with the Muslim world and sound and equal relationships made with the West.

The four objectives explained in the above pages provide for the general framework of our foreign policy. Having laid them out, we can now turn our attention to the kind of foreign policy Iran seeks and promotes.

IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: PRINCIPLES OF DIALOGUE AND

CO-OPERATION

Very simply stated, Iran conceptualised her foreign policy in terms of three interconnected geographical loops. The first loop includes Iran and its neighbours. Iran enjoys satisfactory relationships with Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). We are neither a threat to their security nor do we see them as intending to adopt a hostile approach towards us. Our relations with all Persian Gulf countries also stand at the satisfactory level, while we continue to seek confidence-building measures. At the same time, the varying size of countries on the one hand, and the interventions of great powers on the other hand inhibit the process of confidence building on this loop. Some of our southern neighbours in the Persian Gulf, prompted by external powers, have misperceptions about us. Our foreign policy objectives are clearly aimed at eliminating such misperceptions and creating confidence.

In Afghanistan, we feel that the intervention and manipulation of external powers in the course of the last fifteen years have produced an atmosphere that has deprived the people of Afghanistan from their natural right to self-determination and disrupted regional stability. We think that the solution to the Afghan political problems is only made possible by the political factions and positive co-operation of regional countries.

The second loop extends on the one hand to India, China and Japan and other hand to Europe, with both of which we have and actively pursue good relations on a reciprocal basis. The Zionist regime of Israel is located on the margin of this loop and, unlike China, India, Japan and Europe, has actively pursued a hostile policy towards the Islam Republic of Iran. These policies have ranged from a war of propaganda to terrorist acts. We consider these policies as clearly unacceptable and have formulated our foreign policy vis-୶is Israel on that basis.

The third loop includes the US. The fact is that lack of political relations between Iran and the US is much more detrimental to the US than to us. The American leadership is of the opinion that the world should take shape in accordance with their desires and intends to change the world on that basis . This is in sharp contrast to what is claimed under containment and sanctions policies of the US against the Islamic Republic of Iran are efforts to exert pressure on a country which is not following her assigned path in the new global order.

Let us be clear on this. If we are not currently engaging in a dialogue with the US, it is not because we are a "rogue nation" not in tune with the "civilised" ways of the world. In every arena of our foreign policy we have pursued dialogue and co-operation and we do so because, as is the case with every other nation, it is to our national interest and in keeping with our Islamic values. The trouble with the US is that for a variety of reasons, which may be domestically generated or strategically minded, she has opposed our revolution from its outset and has actively sought to force us to go against our own national interest, undermine the revolution and contain the Islamic revival she perceives as being energised by Iran. The US naturally claims that she has nothing against Islam. But her concrete policies and actions suggest that the only acceptable Islam is the one that subordinates local interests and aspirations to US interests. This, and only this, we of course resist.

We believe that dialogue decreases differences and paves the way for co-operation among nations in an environment free of domination. Iran considers herself to be a full-fledged member of the international community. We know, and do not need to be appropriate solutions. It is worth mentioning here that despite our eight-year war and conflict, we have repeatedly negotiated with our western neighbour, Iraq.

Dialogue without any preconditions over the Tunb and Abu Musa Islands was also raised by Iran and Foreign Minister Velayati even paid a visit to the UAE, a visit that is yet to be reciprocated by his counterpart. We consider the problem to be resolvable through bilateral negotiations. Attempts to broaden the basis of negotiation are bound to fail since they will not fully take into account the two countries involved. We are indeed hopeful that this logic will direct both parties in the direction of a bilateral resolution of the problem.

Iran has not only set the principle of dialogue and constructive relationship as a pattern in its relations with other countries, but has also recommended it as useful for its neighbours' relations with other countries. For instance, we can refer to Iran's role in conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The signing of the Tajikistan Peace Agreement in Tehran was a historical event and the result of constructive dialogue and contacts in which the Islamic Republic of Iran played a key role.

Another case of dialogue related to Iran-Europe relations starting after the Edinburgh Conference in December 1992. Such a relationship contrast with the US-Iran relations because, in spite of tensions, relations with Europe have grown at least since 1992 and continue to grow. Europeans themselves first called this contact "Critical Dialogue" and then "Constructive Dialogue." Clearly, criticism among equal partners will contribute to further development and rationalisation of relations. From the beginning, issues such as human rights, Salman Rushdie, terrorism and weapons were discussed in talks between Iran and the Troika. Clearly these are very touchy subjects that can only be resolved through dialogue and mutual understanding.

President Rafsanjani at the beginning of his letter to the EU Summit, and in response to the Edinburgh Communiqu鬠stated:

The recent communiqu頩ssued by the EU Summit underscores your interest for the necessity of frank and critical exchange of views with the European Community. We believe that problems and challenges in the world, particularly in your and our regions, further necessitate such contacts and exchange of views.

So far, we have held five rounds of talks in a friendly atmosphere, the last of which was in Paris on 13 May 1995. Issues such as the Middle East Peace Process, human rights, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, nuclear weapons and non-proliferation Treaty, terrorism, etc. were discussed and these talks continue without any adverse impact on relations. The important point in these frank and critical dialogues is that parties can express vividly their ideas about the other side's policies and performance.

My emphasis on dialogue should not be interpreted as a commitment merely to words and talks. Iran has also supported her words through concrete co-operative acts. In fact, we count on regional and international co-operation in addition to the human and physical resources we have as a means to enhance our position in the world. Developments in Iran's relations with other countries clearly show Iran's interest in co-operation. Today, we have friendly relations with all countries except the Zionist regime and the US. The resumption of relations with the government of South Africa is yet another evidence of Iran's interest in the establishment and maintenance of healthy relations with all countries.

We have also co-operated in the development of international treaties and conventions. For instance, given our lack of desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction, we have been among the first signatories or even initiators of many international conventions and treaties in this area such as the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) or conventions banning the production of chemical and biological weapons as well as other disarmament agreements.

In sum, we feel that our commitment to internationally recognised rules and regulations has been evident. As such, we see the insistence of some corners to represent us as a pariah state, as self-seeking and derived from exigencies that have nothing to do with Iran's behaviour domestically and internationally. We will of course take time to respond to the charges against us but our main foreign policy task is to serve pre-established and interconnected political, economic and security interests of Iran and these interests clearly direct us to engage in an active policy of dialogue and international co-operation.

جرا ایران تهدیدی برای جهان نیست

Why Iran isn't a global threat

By Ray Takeyh

WASHINGTON – Last week's vote by the International Atomic Energy Agency branding Iran in breach of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments has given impetus to the United States to call for the deferral of Iran to the UN Security Council. Tehran is adamant that it wants nuclear power for generating electricity. Yet, Washington policymakers and their European counterparts subtly argue that Iran's previous treaty violations indicate a more sinister motive to subvert its neighbors and export its Islamic revolution.

Such alarmism overlooks Iran's realities. In the past decade, a fundamental shift in Iran's international orientation has enshrined national interest calculations as the defining factor in its approach to the world. Irrespective of the balance of power between conservatives and reformers, Iran's foreign policy is driven by fixed principles that are shared by all of its political elites.

The intense factional struggles that have plagued the clerical state during the past decade obscure the emergence of a consensus foreign policy. Under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a loose coalition emerged around the notion that Iran cannot remain isolated in the global order.

By cultivating favorable relations with key international actors such as China, Russia, and the European Union, Tehran has sought to craft its own "coalition of willing" and prevent the US from multilateralizing its coercive approach to Iran. Although the Islamic Republic continues its inflammatory support for terrorist organizations battling Israel and is pressing ahead with its nuclear program, its foreign policy is no longer that of a revolutionary state.

This perspective will survive Iran's latest leadership transition. The demographic complexion of the regime's rulers is changing. As Iran's revolution matures and those politicians who were present at the creation of the Islamic Republic gradually recede from the scene, a more austere and dogmatic generation is beginning to take over the reins of power. In response to Iran's manifold problems, newly elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his cabinet frequently criticize their elders' passivity in imposing Islamic strictures and for the rampant corruption that has engulfed the state. They are determined to reverse the social and cultural freedoms of the reformist period and to institute egalitarian economic policies.

On foreign policy issues, however, the new president has stayed well within the parameters of Iran's prevailing international policy. In his August address to the parliament, Mr. Ahmadinejad echoed the existing consensus, noting the importance of constructive relations with "the Islamic world, the Persian Gulf region, the Caspian Sea region, Central Asia, the Pacific area, and Europe." Moreover, the most important voice on foreign policy matters, recently appointed head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, has reiterated these same themes.

Although the assertive nationalists who have taken command of Iran's executive branch have dispensed with their predecessor's "dialogue of civilizations" rhetoric, and display a marked indifference to reestablishment of relations with America, they are loath to jeopardize the successful multilateral détente that was the singular achievement of the reformist era.

All this is not to suggest that the current negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 (France, Britain, and Germany) designed to resolve the nuclear stalemate will resume. More than two years of talks have failed to bridge the essential differences.

Iran continues to assert its right under the NPT to enrich uranium and has accepted an intrusive inspection regime, while the Europeans insist that Iran must atone for its previous treaty violations by permanently suspending such activities. Ultimately, it appears impossible to reconcile these positions.

It is important to note, however, that the divergence between the European and Iranian perspective predated the rise of Ahmadinejad. This highlights a worrisome convergence in Iranian political thought over the past two years: Somehow - as a result of misguided nationalism or a genuine sense of necessity - mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle has become a sine qua non of modern Iranian politics.

Its nuclear ambitions will continue to irritate the international community, but the days when Iran wantonly sought to undermine established authority in the name of Islamic salvation are over. Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's disciples have long abandoned the mission of exporting the revolution, supplanting it with conventional measures of the national interest.

Despite the chorus of concern, Iran's new president has demonstrated no interest in substantially altering the contours of Iran's international policy - nor has the country's ultimate authority, the Supreme Leader. To be sure, the new president's well-honed reactionary instincts will be felt by his hapless constituents as he proceeds to restrict their political and social prerogatives.

But the notion that Iran's foreign policy is entering a new radical state is yet another misreading of the Islamic Republic and its many paradoxes.

• Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and is currently completing a book on Iran's foreign policy

 

Iran's Multifaceted Foreign Policy

Iran's Multifaceted Foreign Policy

Author:	Lionel Beehner, Staff Writer

April 7, 2006

• Introduction
• Who sets Iranian foreign policy?
• What is the outlook of these government officials?
• Which other governing bodies influence Iran’s foreign policy?
• Are these bodies always in agreement on matters of foreign policy?
• What is the role of Iran’s president in foreign relations?
• How much influence does Iran’s Supreme Leader wield?
• What are the Iranian business community’s views on foreign policy?
• What is Iran’s foreign policy toward the United States?

---

Introduction

Iranian foreign policy choices continue to generate concern, from Tehran's nuclear posturing to its activities in Iraq to its support for U.S.-branded terrorist organizations like Hamas or Hezbollah. But where does Iran's foreign policy originate? This question becomes particularly relevant as the United States looks to begin dialogue with Iran on Iraq. The answer reveals much about the divisions within the Iranian leadership. While Iran remains suspicious of—and at times openly hostile to—U.S. ambitions in the Persian Gulf region, its foreign policy has grown more complex and nuanced since the ideological 1980s. In positions of power are moderates as well as militants, reformers as well as revolutionaries. The result is a foreign policy that, experts say, is muddled and far from monolithic. "Although Iran's hard-line leadership has maintained a remarkable unity of purpose in the face of reformist challengers, it is badly fragmented over key foreign policy issues, including the importance of nuclear weapons," wrote Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution and CFR Senior Fellow Ray Takeyh in a 2005 Foreign Affairs article.

Who sets Iranian foreign policy?

The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), currently headed by Ali Larijani. Larijani doubles as Iran's top negotiator on nuclear issues and enjoys close relations with Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has final say over all SNSC decisions. "Decisions in Iran are made by consensus rather than decree" says Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran analyst with the International Crisis Group. "Ayatollah Khamenei rules the country much like a CEO." The SNSC is composed mostly of top officials from the ministries of foreign affairs, intelligence, and interior, as well as military leaders from the army and the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's main security apparatus formed in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

What is the outlook of these government officials?

Many of their foreign views, including those of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were shaped by the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. "[Many of] the first-generation revolutionaries of Iran are still pursuing an ideological or kind of a defensive strategy to maintain the country's revolution," said Mahmood Sariolghalam, a professor of international relations at the National University of Iran, at a recent CFR meeting. Many of these leaders say the West, particularly the United States, was complicit in Saddam Hussein's use of chemical gas against the Iranians. Yet some experts say the orientation of Iran's "war generation" elite has shifted somewhat from the offensive posture it held during the 1980s. Then, it sought to export the Islamic Revolution throughout the Middle East, by violence if necessary—but today, the elite has adopted a more defensive and pragmatic stance. Others, including some U.S. officials, say anti-Israel statements by Ahmadinejad are more reflective of the Iranian regime's true character, which would become even more worrisome if Iran acquired nuclear capabilities.

Which other governing bodies influence Iran’s foreign policy?

There are several, experts say. Iran's parliament, the Majlis, has the power to approve all international agreements, contracts, and treaties. But the Guardian Council, a highly influential twelve-member body of six clerics and six conservative jurists picked by the Supreme Leader, has veto power over all decisions made by the Majlis. Another body, the Expediency Council, arbitrates between the Majlis and the Guardian Council, and consults the Supreme Leader when these two bodies fail to reach agreement. The Expediency Council is chaired by former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who continues to wield considerable behind-the-scenes influence over foreign policy. Khamenei recently expanded the powers of the Expediency Council. Finally, experts say the Revolutionary Guards also play an increasingly important role in setting foreign policy. The Revolutionary Guards are reported to be training, funding, and equipping Shiite militias in southern Iraq.

Are these bodies always in agreement on matters of foreign policy?

No. In fact, their policies can often appear contradictory. For example, when Larijani and others say Tehran's uranium-enrichment program is for peaceful purposes, these statements are undermined, experts say, by Ahmadinejad's repeated calls for the elimination of Israel. Reformists within the Majlis often accuse the executive branch of taking stances that are too confrontational. Also, Iran's foreign ministry has a sometimes conflicting agenda in Iraq with its Revolutionary Guards, particularly on the issue of Tehran's relationship with anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. The foreign ministry prefers not to deal with Sadr, while the Revolutionary Guards have reportedly established close contacts with Sadr's militia, the Mahdi Army, and even provide his troops with financial and material support. But William Samii, an Iran expert with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, says the examples cited above are more emblematic of a lack of coordination than a rift within the ruling elite.

What is the role of Iran’s president in foreign relations?

Ahmadinejad has some influence over foreign policy—he appoints the cabinet and the head of the SNSC—but power remains mostly in the hands of the SNSC and the Supreme Leader. "[Ahmadinejad] is a small piece of the puzzle and can be influential on the fringes, but certainly not [by] steering Iranian foreign or nuclear policy," Sadjadpour says. Experts say Ahmadinejad's controversial statements calling for Israel's elimination should not be construed as official foreign policy. "He's sort of a bull in a china shop and neophyte in foreign affairs," says Samii. "He does not have great input on [Iranian] foreign policy. But he hasn't been president six months and he's managed to alienate most of the international community." Two days after his anti-Israel comments, Khamenei came out publicly to say Iran's official policy was one of nonaggression toward all members of the United Nations. "He made it very clear: enough of this talk," Sadjadpour says. Older generations in Iran, particularly centrists like Rafsanjani and former president Mohammed Khatami, have been particularly critical of Ahmadinejad's hard-line foreign policy, as well as his "wholesale replacement of state officials," says Samii.

How much influence does Iran’s Supreme Leader wield?

Sadjadpour says Khamenei plays a more influential role in Iranian foreign affairs now than at any point in his seventeen-year reign. According to Iran's constitution, the Supreme Leader serves as commander-in-chief of the armed and police forces; the head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the state ministry in control of television and radio; and leader of the country's judiciary. Most important, "he's the person steering the Iranian nuclear ship," Sadjadpour says. "But if you look at his track record the last seventeen years, he's been someone who has wanted neither confrontation nor accommodation with the West." Sariolghalam likens Iran's stance to that of the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev, saying, "[The policy] is not to provoke the United States nor intervene in Iraq but to maintain some degree of conflict." Khamenei, Samii says, also has the power to transfer authority to anyone or any office he deems necessary. The Supreme Leader also has representatives within all of Iran's governing bodies who report back to him.

What are the Iranian business community’s views on foreign policy?

Its greatest fear, experts say, is the threat posed by UN Security Council sanctions, which might further cripple Iran's economy and cut off investment. Iran's economy is dependent on outside investors and overly reliant on its energy sector. More than 90 percent of Iranians receive their income from the state. Although Iran, buoyed by high oil prices, has $40 billion in foreign exchange reserves, its economy suffers from high unemployment and rampant inflation. "What we've seen from the Iranians over the last fifteen years is that they are hypersensitive to threats to their economy," said Brookings' Middle East expert Pollack at a recent CFR meeting. And the Supreme Leader is aware of this, Sadjadpour says. "He realizes Iran is dependent on foreign investment, must have good relations with the outside world, and cannot survive in isolation."

What is Iran’s foreign policy toward the United States?

Officially, Tehran and Washington have had no formal diplomatic relations since the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration dealt clandestinely with Iran by selling the regime arms in exchange for Americans held hostage in Lebanon. There has also been some low-level cooperation between Washington and Tehran on antidrug policies, counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, and anti-oil-smuggling efforts in Iraq. More recently, in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, Iran reportedly made an overture to U.S. officials to begin what former U.S. policymaker Flynt Leverett says was "a diplomatic process intended to resolve on a comprehensive basis all the bilateral differences between the United States and Iran." The Americans, preoccupied with Iraq, rebuffed the offer. "There was skepticism that this was a serious Iranian offer and not an overture from the highest levels in Iran," Sadjadpour says.

In recent weeks, Larijani has indicated a willingness to engage U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad on the issue of Iraq. Others in Iran have also expressed a desire to deal directly with Washington, instead of through proxies like Russia or the so-called EU-3, on the nuclear issue. "It's better to negotiate with the Great Satan than with little Satans," said Ali Zadsar, a member of Iran's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, as reported by RFE/RL. On Iraq, the Bush administration has approved such talks with Iran but no schedule has been set.

سیاست خارجی ایران

Criticizing the Islamic Republic Helps Dissidents Inside Iran

No. President George W. Bush’s repeated statements of support for the Iranian people do not help normal Iranians. In the summer of 2003, the last time major riots took place in Tehran, Bush’s expression of solidarity with the rioters forced the reform-minded parliament to condemn American interference. At least one student leader, Abdullah Momeni, lamented that Bush’s statement had given the state “an excuse for repression.”

The Clinton administration, on the other hand, quickly grasped that publicly defending beleaguered Iranian reformists simply allowed the clerics to accuse reformers of being American lackeys. President Clinton also learned the cost of criticizing Iran’s unaccountable, clerical elite. During an otherwise quite conciliatory speech in 1999, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright contrasted the elected and unelected branches of Iran’s government, and any potential benefits of her speech were drowned in a barrage of Iranian invective.

American criticism has a perverse effect because the United States has no diplomatic or economic relations with Iran, and hence no leverage. The United States is a declared enemy of the Islamic Republic, and Iran reflexively does the opposite of what it advises. The EU, on the other hand, as well as the United Nations and some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are engaged in Iran and do not (publicly, at least) seek the downfall of the Islamic Republic.

That gives the EU and others some modest leverage with Iran’s clerical rulers. Most recently, some foreign governments and NGOs joined Iranian activists to press for the release of bloggers and Internet journalists arrested on the suspicion of espionage. They succeeded.

“If Iraq Becomes a Democracy, so Will Iran”
Wishful thinking. This theory, peddled by some American neoconservatives, should never have left the matchbox on which it was scribbled. Iran and Iraq are neighbors, but a border is about all they share.

Iran is a mostly Persian-speaking nation inhabited by ethnic Persians (albeit with sizeable, dispersed minorities), inside logical borders, and on the site of ancient Persian empires. Nearly all Iranians are Shias. In Iraq, on the other hand, Shia Arabs, Sunni Kurds, and Sunni Arabs live inside borders drawn up with imperial carelessness less than a century ago. Few Iranians, even those opposed to the Islamic Republic, question Iran’s integrity within its current borders. The same is not true in Iraq.

It is true that in the mid-20th century, there was a brief, superficial convergence when both Iran and Iraq had Western-backed monarchies. But as Iraq slid from Baathist socialism to Saddam Hussein’s atheistic, Sunni-dominated totalitarianism, Iran experienced a revolution. Following a year or so of anarchic pluralism, Iran set up a semi-democratic, anti-Western, Shia theocracy.

Having suffered under the Baathists, many of Iraq’s Shia clerics today enjoy considerable prestige in their country. But in Iran the people have been alienated by the appetite many clerics have shown for worldly power. Neither these manifest differences nor the horrendous Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s has deterred successive U.S. administrations from classifying Iran and Iraq together. They were twin targets of Clinton’s “dual containment.” They are two thirds of Bush’s “axis of evil.”

If Middle Eastern countries are prone to drop like dominoes, why didn’t Iran follow the course of Turkey in the 20th century? The two nations share a long border and much common history. Like Iran, Turkey entered that century as an ailing monarchy threatened by incipient democracy. Both countries were transformed after World War I by strong, modernizing leaders. Today, Turkey stands at the threshold of the EU; Iran fears attack by the United States.

“Iran Cannot Be Reformed from Within”
Wrong again. Iran can and will be reformed from within. Demographics make that course inevitable. Some 70 percent of Iran’s 70 million citizens are under the age of 30, and young Iranians are more reform-minded than older groups. That was made clear in a survey conducted by Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, whose initial findings were released in 2001. The survey confirmed that young people resent existing political restrictions more than their elders, and that they are less religiously observant. Thirty-one percent of people aged 15 to 29 favored a “fundamental change in the state of affairs”—a euphemism for making the constitution more democratic. Given continuing dissatisfaction with clerical rule, those figures have likely risen since the survey was taken in 2001.

From Tehran’s well-heeled uptown to its poorer areas, the spread of material values and sexual freedom is palpable, as is a desire for smaller families. Universities are increasingly dominated by women, and female university graduates already outnumber their male counterparts. Young people display little animus for the once hated United States. Of course, it is true that six years of conservative pressure on President Mohammad Khatami’s government have taken their toll on his movement and those Iranians who support it. Iran’s reform-minded millions lack a common ideology and leadership. And it is likely that, by disqualifying reformist candidates, a conservative vetting body will decide June’s presidential election in advance.

Yet, the Islamic Republic today is more responsive to the popular mood than it likes to admit. In big cities such as Tehran, social freedoms and their attendant distortions cannot be stamped out, so the authorities do not really try. In the upcoming elections, all conservative candidates will pay lip service to the importance of individual, even political, freedoms. A new generation of Iranians will, despite Khatami’s failure, spur further reform. The process would benefit from a critical dialogue with the United States, rather than the current, glowering standoff. As long as Iran fears America’s intentions, and the United States vilifies the Islamic Republic, Iran’s authoritarian leaders will have an excuse to suppress dissent and to label reformers as traitors.

 

سیاست خارجی ایران

The Iranian People Support Their Leaders’ Nuclear Program”
Not really. Iranians who vocally support their country’s nuclear ambitions tend to be strong supporters of the Islamic Republic, and they are a minority. In today’s sullenly depoliticized Iran, it is the mundane issues that animate people: the price of staple products, for instance, or changes in the terms of required military service. In the four and a half years that I have lived in Iran, I have been present at impromptu debates by normal Iranians on these and other humdrum topics, but only rarely have I heard discussions about national strategy or Iran’s geopolitics. I have never witnessed a spontaneous discussion of the nuclear program among average Iranians.

True, the few opinion polls that have been commissioned, mostly by organs close to Iran’s conservative establishment, found strong public support for the country’s declared goal of becoming a nuclear fuel producer. But there is good reason to be skeptical about their findings. It would be quite remarkable if a populace increasingly disengaged from politics were suddenly energized by something as arcane as nuclear fuel and its byproducts. Iran’s educated urbanites are mostly aware of the nuclear issue, but they are emphatic in their disdain for politics and politicians.

It’s unlikely that many Iranians would be willing to put up with the economic and diplomatic isolation that would likely result if Iran insisted on enriching uranium. And the Islamic Republic would hesitate to ask them to do so, for it is the regime, not the international community, that would feel the backlash.

“Only the Threat of Force Can Dissuade Iran from Advancing with Its Nuclear Plans”
Doubtful. The threat of imminent force might cause Iran to back down, but it could also have the opposite effect, encouraging Iran to leave the NPT and to develop a nuclear weapon as fast as possible.

The United States and Israel have reacted aggressively to official Iranian statements suggesting it will never abandon its goal of achieving a nuclear fuel cycle. But these countries do not have official relations with Iran and have little opportunity to judge the sincerity of the statements. In private, both Iranian and foreign officials acquainted with the European negotiations say that Iran is more flexible than it appears. In the words of one well-connected Iranian conservative, “The fuel cycle is not an article of faith, but a card to play.”

What does Iran hope to gain from playing this card? According to Iranian officials I have spoken with, Iran would revise its nuclear plans if the United States abandoned its policy of undermining the Islamic Republic and its clerical rulers and started lifting economic sanctions. Ultimately, the Islamic Republic might refuse to publicly relinquish its nuclear goals, preferring instead to extend the current negotiations indefinitely. If major incentives accompanied a credible threat of severe consequences, however, it is hard to imagine the clerics actually carrying out their threat to restart their enrichment activities.

“U.S. Military Action Would Embolden Dissidents to Topple the Islamic Republic”
Wrong. Six or seven years ago, when free speech was flourishing, it was plausible that a group of radical thinkers in Iranian universities would crystallize into a dissident movement. No longer. A few dozen student leaders have been jailed, tortured, or otherwise silenced, and the rest have been bludgeoned by the hard facts of Iranian economic life—high unemployment, raging inflation, and state dominance of labor. Some 80 percent of Iran’s economy is state controlled. Naturally, workers tend to pick up their paychecks quietly, keeping their heads down and mouths shut.

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, some young Iranians told journalists that they hoped Iran would be next. Today, that sentiment is less often expressed. One reason is that Iranians don’t want Iraq’s wretched conditions to be replicated in Iran. A second is that Iranians opposed to the Islamic Republic lack a unifying ideology. Support for the two traditional opposition groups, the monarchists and the People’s Mujahideen, is weak. The obvious challenge to the Islamic Republic is liberal democracy, but the state does not permit discussion of what that would entail or how to get there.

It is possible that some Iranians would cheer a U.S. invasion, but not for long. The first Iranian body bag would galvanize anti-American sentiment, especially if that bag contained the corpse of an unsuspecting young conscript or an innocent civilian. This message seems to have been absorbed by Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s exiled son. “Iranians are not willing to buy freedom at any cost,” Pahlavi said recently. “They do not want the freedom of an American general marching in

 

سیاست خارجی ایران

Tehran’s desire for a nuclear bomb has put it in Washington’s cross hairs. But neither President George W. Bush’s repeated condemnations of Iran’s clerical rulers nor the threat of military force will advance the cause of democracy there. When Iran reforms, it will happen because its youth—not the United States—demands it.

“If Iran Gets a Nuclear Bomb, Iran Will Use It”
Very unlikely. Let’s assume that the Iranians have a nuclear weapons program. What do they intend to do with it? Iran almost certainly does not intend to brandish a nuclear bomb in an attempt to intimidate its regional enemy, Israel, or its global nemesis, the United States. Such belligerence could be catastrophic for the Islamic Republic. Iran’s clerical leaders govern a country with little revolutionary zeal and a fundamentally unsound economy dependent on oil revenues. Iran’s economy cannot withstand the sanctions that would come with nuclear gunslinging. Furthermore, the clerics have blessed a partial détente with their Arab neighbors and with the European Union (EU), whose major powers (Britain, France, and Germany) are engaged in delicate negotiations with Iran. The clerics are in no mood to give up the economic and diplomatic benefits of these relationships.

If Iran wanted nuclear technology for peaceful uses, it is fair to ask, why did it hide efforts to get that technology? The Iranians argue that alerting the world to its nuclear acquisitions would have allowed the United States to block its supply lines. That may be true, but there is another possible explanation: Iran hid its interest in nuclear technology because that interest was military in nature. There is plausible circumstantial evidence—most of it collected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—to suggest that Iran’s nuclear program is not purely civilian. For more than 10 years, Iran concealed important changes to its nuclear inventory and maintained a clandestine procurement effort. Some of Iran’s actions violated the explicit terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); others flouted its spirit. The IAEA’s failure to find hard evidence that Iran is trying to weaponize its nuclear technology does not mean that there is no such effort.

But Iran’s nuclear ambiguity is calculated, a reaction to the vulnerability it feels. Iran probably intends to gather all the elements necessary for bomb making, so that it can go nuclear the moment that it feels a U.S. or Israeli attack is imminent. In the meantime, Iranian officials brag—speciously, some argue—of their “mastery” of nuclear fuel-cycle technology. As one senior State Department official put it, “The Iranians don’t necessarily have to have a successful nuclear program … they merely have to convince us, others, and their neighbors that they do.”

“Iran Has No Use for Nuclear Power”
False. Iran is the second-largest oil producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and has the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves. But its energy needs are rising faster than its ability to meet them. Driven by a young population and high oil revenues, Iran’s power consumption is growing by around 7 percent annually, and its capacity must nearly triple over the next 15 years to meet projected demand.

Where will the electricity come from? Not from the oil sector. It is retarded by U.S. sanctions, as well as inefficiency, corruption, and Iran’s institutionalized distrust of Western investors. Since 1995, when the sector was opened to a handful of foreign companies, Iran has added 600,000 barrels per day to its crude production, enough to offset depletion in aging fields, but not enough to boost output, which has stagnated at around 3.7 million barrels per day since the late 1990s. Almost 40 percent of Iran’s crude oil is consumed locally. If this figure were to rise, oil revenues would fall, spelling the end of the strong economic growth the country has enjoyed since 1999. Plugging the gap with natural gas is not possible—yet. Iran’s gigantic gas reserves are only just being tapped, so Iran remains a net importer.

The main goal of Iranian foreign policy is to counter U.S. efforts to isolate it. This partly explains the ambitious agreement that Iran and China signed last year, under which China may buy as much as $70 billion of Iranian liquefied natural gas over the next 30 years, while developing a large Iranian oil field. It is no accident that the agreement was with a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, which the United States would like to use to sanction Iran for its nuclear activities. Iran is also schmoozing other influential Asian countries with energy deals, particularly Japan and India. It makes sense for Iran to free up its hydrocarbons for export, but why pour money into a hugely expensive nuclear fuel-cycle program when other nations have said they will sell Iran the nuclear fuel that it needs? Iran contends that the United States may pressure foreign sellers into stopping the flow. This is unconvincing: Those very same foreigners buy its oil and pledge to buy its gas in the face of American disapproval. Iran’s desire for a complete fuel cycle is the most suspicious aspect of its nuclear program

 

سباست خارجی ایران

Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran's international relations have been marked by more than occasional instability and turbulence, entangling Tehran into costly periodic crises vis-à-vis individual nations or groups of nations. In this context, I define "crisis" as a condition in which Iran's foreign policies have come into conflict with its own national interests or the national interests of other nations, leading to a significant decline in Iran's international standing. The most significant of these crises are:

▪ the hostage crisis in Tehran

▪ the war with Iraq (1980-88)

▪ the "spiral conflict" with the United States

▪ the sustained internal struggle over foreign policy

▪ the current nuclear predicament.

Whenever the Islamic Republic of Iran has acknowledged its international predicaments, it has often blamed foreign powers, the United States and Israel in particular, for conspiring against the revolution and the regime in Tehran. Some of its enemies have argued that the crises are premeditated and are being used by the regime as a survival strategy. Conspiracy theories have a special place in Iranian political culture. Other explanations have focused on the religious basis of its foreign policy, its rampant cronyism and mismanagement, the failure of any attempts at political reform, and the lack of any comprehension of global realities after the cold war.

These explanations are justified, but limited in breadth and depth. A more complex analysis must also account for other more significant and highly interrelated reasons. They include:

▪ the Islamic Republic's "spiral conflict" with the US

▪ its theocratic state model

▪ its eastward orientation

▪ its misguided foreign-policy priorities

▪ its lack of trust in international community

▪ the tension between the interests of Iran and its commitment to Islam

▪ the Islamic Republic's abandonment of Iran's pre-revolutionary economic role in the middle east towards a new political-military position with a focus upon the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Tehran and Washington

The first and most important source of conflict in Iran's international relations is its "spiral conflict" with the United States, and the US policy to isolate, contain, and/or change the Islamic regime. A "spiral conflict" is one in which both parties escalate each other's extreme positions to new heights, based on a mixture of fact and fiction, misperceptions and misunderstandings, distrust and demonisation.

In a "spiral conflict", discussions turn ideological, each side becoming increasingly obsessed with the other, leading to the mismanagement of the relations. Even well-intended actions become a cause for further animosity. Significantly, "spiral conflicts" make negotiable grievances look non-negotiable, preventing the parties from serious engagement.

This fact should become a major source for concern, given that the current US-Iran "spiral conflict" embodies the most formidable global political issues of our time: nuclear non-proliferation, terrorism, the middle-east peace process, human rights, democratisation and political reform.

A foreign-policy model

Iran's theocratic state model is a second source of conflict in its foreign relations, as it is antithetical to an increasingly secular world in which faith is a private matter and governments are not the only global players. The problem has been compounded in recent times, after the Bush administration identified radical Islam an enemy and made fighting terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation its top foreign-policy priorities. Iran's nuclear program, its association with Hizbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and the harsh pronouncements of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against Israel and the Jews have made Tehran a convenient target.

The Islamic Republic prioritises its foreign relations in the following order of importance: Islamic nations, neighbouring countries, regional states (minus Israel), and extra-regional states. Accordingly, improving its relationship with the United States is not considered to be a priority.

No wonder that maintaining a state of "no war-no peace" (or détente, as Iran's former president, Mohammad Khatami used to call it), has been Tehran's primary policy approach to Washington. Unfortunately, this approach has become institutionalised as the basis for Iran's foreign policy and is today shared by reformists, pragmatists, and radicals alike.

There are at least two reasons for why this approach has undermined a stable Iranian foreign policy. First, the United States has increasingly become uneasy with this détente and it has tried at every opportunity to move relations towards more peace or more conflict. Second, despite Iran's desire to the contrary, most Islamic nations in Iran's region tend to be its adversaries, whereas most of its regional supporters are non-Muslim states. In addition to Israel, Iran's adversaries include Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan and many Arab states; while its supporters include Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and India!

This prioritisation also means that China, India, and Russia come before Europe and the United States, as far as the Iranian foreign-policy establishment is concerned. This eastward orientation has not been welcomed by Washington at a time of growing demand for world oil in the face of declining supplies, particularly considering that China, a rising contender for superpower status, is the source of most of this increased demand. For the United States, Iran has adopted the wrong stance in the world's geopolitics. Unless Iran changes its stance or is weakened as a potential ally to China, the United States will not tolerate the Islamic regime in Tehran.

The Islamic Republic's foreign policy makes a third troubling division among the world community of states: those who are its friends, those who are its enemies, and those whom it mistrusts, either as potential adversaries or allies. The trouble is that the first two categories include the most powerful states of the world, such as the United States, larger European states, Russia, and China!

Even though a large number of the Group of 77 sympathises with Iran, only a few even among this association of (now 131) developing-world states at the United Nations are trusted by Tehran. Iran still needs to learn that nations have no permanent enemies or friends but only permanent interests.

Iran's lack of trust in the international community, and the west in particular, has both historic and contemporary roots. It is instructive to recall a few episodes.

When the Iranians staged a constitutional revolution in 1906, the British and Russians tried to destroy it, and in the end they succeeded in ending the movement by means of the coup that brought Reza Shah to power in 1921.

In the 1930s, the British refused to help Iran develop its railways, alleging that it would help Russia to access the Persian Gulf. Ironically, after Iran had built the railways with little outside help, the allied forces used it to move soldiers and equipment to Moscow for the purpose of defeating the Nazis. Iran was then declared the "bridge of victory."

In 1953, when the Iranians moved to nationalise their oil, the British intelligence service, with support from the CIA, overthrew the democratically elected president, Mohammad Mosaddeq, alleging that he and his supporters would allow the communists to dominate the country through the pro-Russian Tudeh Party.

In the 1960s, the west refused to help Iran build its steel industry and the late Mohammad Reza Shah had to turn to the Soviet Union for economic support. In 1979, when the Iranians overthrew the Shah, hoping to establish a democratic republic, the United States tried to change its course through a few attempted coups.

The Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s confirmed Iran's deep-seated suspicions regarding the international political situation. Few states came to the aid of Iran despite the fact that most could see that Iraq was the invader and Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons and missiles against Iranian civilians. Currently, the western world, and in particular the United States, is focusing upon preventing Iran from developing civilian nuclear technology.

The fact is that whatever the Iranians have tried to do in the direction of development and democracy in the last one hundred years, the west has considered it dangerous and presented itself as an obstacle, thus increasingly eroding Iran's trust and drawing its animosity.

Thus, from its inception, the Islamic regime has been struggling with a foreign policy to remain independent of the east and the west. That goal was in itself a difficult one to achieve; the regime made it even harder by insisting that its foreign policy must also serve both Iran and Islam.

Initially, Islam came first as Iran's foreign policy emphasised exporting the revolution, particularly to neighbouring Arab nations, a policy that has heightened tensions between the Islamic Republic and the Arab world. Over time, Iran's foreign policy has become more pragmatic and focused upon Iran's national interests, as it begin emphasising participation in international agencies, economic liberalisation, post-war reconstruction, and selective global integration.

However, the fundamentalist elements continue to push for a more Islamic approach, and therefore, the tension between the interests of Iran and Islam in the foreign policy continues as Tehran vacillates between the world's integrative and disintegrative forces. To balance the interests of the various Islamic factions, Tehran's international relations continue to espouse the principles of independence, egalitarianism, and support for oppressed people throughout the world, and particularly oppressed Muslims. Active participation in the Group of 77 and the denunciation of "American arrogance" and "Israeli Zionism" are aspects of this foreign-policy philosophy.

A new faultline

A final source of instability in Iran's international relations is the Islamic Republic's role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, having replaced the Arab states. Specifically, over the past two decades or so, the Arab states have gradually moved away from their traditional militaristic role vis-à-vis Israel towards an approach motivated by economic interests, in which foreign investment and trade are used to integrate the Arab, American and European economies, indirectly also incorporating Jewish economic interests. It is no surprise that the traditional Arab-Israeli conflict has increasingly become a Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Meanwhile, Iran has moved in exactly the opposite direction, sacrificing its traditional economic role in the region and relations with the west and Israel for its new political and military objectives. This transformation was more a consequence of the Islamic revolution than the American sanctions against Iran. Seeking to become the leader of the Islamic world, the new Islamic regime in Tehran was more than happy to occupy the position that the "defeated" Arab nation had vacated. This opportunity, the new leaders thought, could also elevate Iran to its historic position as "the representative of the east" in its fight for independence from the west.

Consequently, the primary faultline in middle-eastern politics is moving away from the Arab-Israeli conflict towards an Iran-Israeli conflict, and by extension, a US-Iran conflict. The Israeli-Hizbollah war in Lebanon in July-August 2006 was the first proxy war between Iran and the US in the Arab world. Because Israel does not wish to confront Iran single-handedly, it has increasingly relied upon the United States to keep Iran's ambitions and power in check. As long as the United States is willing to perform this role, Israel will not engage Iran in a direct conflict. With the Democrats now (after the mid-term elections of 7 November) in charge of the US Congress, the Americans will only become more confirmed in this role.

A rising power?

The Islamic Republic's turbulent foreign relations have resulted in immense economic and technological costs, many strategic losses, a general erosion of its legitimacy, and international isolation and distrust. Worse yet, the crises have led Iran to face the United States and Israel as two powerful and resolute enemies in a dangerous neighbourhood and at a time of significant domestic discord.

Notwithstanding this vulnerability, some pundits have argued for the "rising power" of Iran. Some among them have made this argument as a warning, hoping to convince the United States, Israel, or the collective international powers that the threat posed by Iran must be checked by sanctions or a war. Others are interested in using this argument to convince the United States to engage Iran diplomatically. So far, only the first group has been heard.

However, the arguments in favour of the rising power of Iran overemphasise certain developments while disregarding other countervailing ones. First, the destruction of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, the two main enemies of the Islamic Republic, is said to have increased Iran's power in the region. This argument ignores the fact that both Iraq and Afghanistan border on Iran and are currently wracked by ethnic and sectarian conflicts, which threaten Iran, a multi-ethnic nation, rather than strengthen it. It is not surprising that Tehran does not wish to see the United States leave Iraq or Afghanistan before it has achieved some degree of political stability. (This view was conveyed to me by Mohammad Khatami in New York in September 2006).

Second, it has been argued that the Shi'a are rising in power while the Sunni are declining. Examples are drawn from Shi'a political movements in Iraq and Lebanon as well as a few smaller movements in other Arab nations. In the wake of Saddam Hussein's demise and the inability of Israel to extirpate Hizbollah, Shi'a have certainly become more emboldened and assertive than anytime prior.

Nevertheless, this political assertiveness cannot be translated into effective political power for the majority of the Shi'a population throughout the middle east, which is largely downtrodden and oppressed. Iran is also unwilling to identify its Islamic ideology as a specifically Shi'a one, fearing the sectarian conflict that some of its opponents clearly wish to promote. Besides, Shi'a in the Arab world more often identify as Arabs first, and only then as Shi'a, as the Iran-Iraq war has clearly demonstrated.

Third, it is claimed that the failure of the United States in Iraq and the weakening position of George W Bush translates into more power for Iran, particularly because Iran has significant influence in Iraq. Even if the United States were to get bogged down in Iraq for a long time, Washington would still have a hundred times more destructive power than Iran could ever muster.

Besides, the recent elections will move the Bush administration to the political centre, forcing Democrats and Republicans to compromise upon a bipartisan Iraq plan. Such a development will erode most of Iran's relative advantage in Iraq, particularly if the new policy were to re-enfranchise Iraqi Sunni.

The relative decline of Israeli power vis-à-vis that of the Arab street and the Palestinian popular movement is said to be the fourth development that promotes Iran's growing power. It is argued that this decline, coupled with the increasing conventional and strategic military power of Iran, will in due course lead to the establishment of a balance of power between these two current nemeses.

While Israel has no Arab army to defeat these days anymore, it does possess the fourth largest army in the world, with over 200 nuclear bombs, and can destroy any regional enemy force in no time. Short of becoming an immense nuclear power, Iran can hardly match Israel - and in the current political climate, Iran will never be allowed to take the nuclear route to the end.

Finally, the Islamic Republic's political-military build-up and assertiveness is no substitute for its lack of adequate economic and technological progress and the erosion of its popular legitimacy. While hard power - military force - still matters, it is increasingly the soft power of nations, the legitimacy of their domestic and international actions, that define their national strength. Failing to normalise its relations with the west, reform its domestic politics and translate the windfall oil revenue into jobs for its youth and improved living standards for its poor, the Islamic Republic will remain weak and fragile both at home and in the international community. This is despite the fact that Iran is a historic and resource-rich country with a strategic location, rich civilisation, deep and penetrating culture, and proud and intelligent people.

An end to "spiral conflict"?

In short, as long as the sources of instability in Iran's foreign relations are not removed or reduced, Iran will continue to remain a source of concern for the world community, just as the world community will remain a source of trouble and weakness for Iran. The only possibility for resolving this problem lies in changing the US-Iran "spiral conflict" into a US-Iran "spiral cooperation."

To resolve its "spiral conflict" with the United States, Iran must accept a political solution to its problems. Under former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, its approach to regional and international policy focused upon expanding economic ties; under Mohammad Khatami, upon cultural relations; and under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, upon religious ideology. None of these approaches have worked. The fact is that the US-Iran "spiral conflict" is in its essence political and ideological.

The United States can initiate a change towards normalising relations with Iran by removing the concept of regime change from its policy towards Iran, to which the Islamic Republic must respond by offering an acceptable compromise for its nuclear programmes. As things stand, any movement forward must involve a mutually acceptable compromise over Iran's nuclear programmes, one that recognises Iran's right to civilian use of nuclear technology but verifiably and positively prevents it from diverting this technology towards any military uses.

I think it is possible to arrive at such a solution, provided that the United States places a huge pile of carrots upon the negotiating table for Iranians to see, while at the same time placing a similarly large pile of sticks under that very same table for the Islamic regime to see.

To conclude: in the new global age, Iran's national security is best guaranteed and its power best augmented through national development and democratic change. These will require the normalisation of relations with the United States. It is instructive to recall the fact that no country has ever become democratic in recent history without diplomatic ties with the United States. Iran will not be an exception to this rule.

The US will also benefit from normalisation because a weakened Iran is ultimately not best for the US and the region. In the recent times, a strong Iran has often been an anchor for regional stability, while a weakened Iran has encouraged regional outlaws to stir trouble. Besides, if Iran's democratisation process and its economic and political development were to be further arrested, the country could conceivably move towards fascism, given the frustrated state of the Iranian youth - a dangerous possibility for all parties involved.

 

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